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Vol. XIX JUNE, 1934 No. 4
THE PROBLEM OF APPARENTLY UNGUIDED ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE DISCRETION*
BY LEWIs ALLEN SIGLER
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Through the last sixty years there has developed in England
and the United States a system of what has since been termed
administrative control over persons and property.' This admin-
istrative system has developed so rapidly that today it controls
many of the activities of the American people.2 The system can
probably be accounted for on the theory that the legislatures and
the courts found themselves unable to function adequately under
the increased burdens incident to modern developments and re-
alized that administrative agencies are better qualified to perform
certain of the functions which they themselves formerly per-
formed, as well as many of the new functions, due to the steady
expansion of governmental activity, which they were called upon
to perform.
In order to perform the functions2a for which they were cre-
ated, administrative agencies 3 necessarily have been endowed
*Submitted in fulfillment of requirement for degree of M.A. in Political
Science, Washington University, 1934.
1 Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property (1928).
2 Frankfurter and Davison, Cases on Administrative Law (1932) Pref-
ace; Pound, C. W., Constitutional Aspects of Administrative Law (1923)
9 A. B. A. J. 409.
2a Infra, 264.
a The type of administrative agency discussed in this thesis is confined to
that type which "while acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capac-
ity" "interferes with the conduct of the individual."
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with discretionary powers. But "discretionary powers" is a broad
term. There are different kinds. Administrative agencies are
sometimes given one kind and sometimes another. In order to
get an adequate conception of the problem, it is necessary to break
up the concept of discretion into its component elements. The
following analysis is based upon an analysis advanced by Profes-
sor Ernst Freund.4
1. One kind of discretion is called "prudential" or "quasi-
legislative" discretion. This is the power to act upon the basis
of considerations of expediency. It is this type of discretion
which the state often delegates to its officials in dealing with the
state's own property. An example is the power to say whether
road-building machinery, when not in use, shall be stored in one
part of the state or in another, or the power to say whether the
court house shall be swept once a day or once a week. The legis-
lature always, in theory, exercises a prudential discretion. "The
subjection of private action to [such discretion] represents the
strongest kind of governmental control." G The use of this type
of discretion for controlling private action has so far been a lim-
ited one. Examples are statutes requiring a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from a public service commission be-
fore operating a certain type of public utility, or the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1912 authorizing the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to order the building of physical connections between rail
and water carriers when reasonably necessary.
2. A second kind of discretion, called "mediating," is the power
to act upon the basis of considerations of fairness.6 An example,
as it has been conferred by the legislature, is the power to fix
reasonable rates for common carriers and public utilities.
3. A third kind of discretion is called "censorial" discretion,
which is the power to act upon the basis of considerations of con-
formity. An example is the power to censor plays and moving
pictures if they do not measure up to the conventional standard of
right and wrong.
4. A fourth kind of discretion is called "quasi-judicial" or "ex-
pert" discretion. It is the power to act upon the basis of con-
siderations of fitness and is found in statutes regulating "safety,
4 Freund, op. cit., n. 1, at pp. 71-103.
S Ibid, at p. 74. 6 Ibid., at p. 72.
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health, traffic, finance, professional competence," or dealing With
questions of "serviceability of commodities, equipment, and im-
provements." It is this type of discretion with which the public
is most familiar, for statutes conferring it have been numerous,
and they all operate directly upon the individual.
An entirely different classification of discretionary powers is
based on the presence or absence of standards for the guidance of
the administrative agency-that is, it is based on the quantity
rather than on the quality of discretion. This classification nec-
essarily overlaps the other, for no matter whether the discretion
be called prudential, expert, censorial, or mediating, the question
remains, whether there are standards for the guidance of the ad-
ministrative authority in exercising its discretion, and whether
those standards are expressed in the statute conferring the
discretion.
1. First, there is an "unqualified" or "unguided" discretion.
A statute conferring this type of discretion makes private action
dependent upon official approval, but provides no grounds upon
which the official power of approval or disapproval is to be exer-
cised. Complete freedom is given, so that practically no issue
as to the correct or incorrect exercise of the discretion can be
made successfully.
The existence of an absolutely unqualified power over private
interests in a governmental agency is inconceivable in a constitu-
tional, or limited, form of government such as the American. An
unqualified power is an arbitrary power; it is an attribute of
sovereignty. The theory of the American constitution does not
admit of the existence of such a power in any body other than the
one which has the power to change the constitution, theory and
all. That body is the "people." It is elementary that neither the
national nor the state legislatures possess an unqualified power.
It is equally clear that the legislatures could confer no such power.
Any attempt to do so would be futile.
2. Then there is a "qualified" or "guided" discretion, which is
the converse of the type just discussed. Such discretion is quali-
fied in that it must be exercised in accordance with some guide or
standard. These guides are of two kinds: (a) those expressly
set forth in the statute conferring the discretion, and (b) those
which are implied. In either case the basic question or problem
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is the same, and that is whether the guide will be considered suffi-
cient to satisfy constitutional requirements, and the requirements
of a sound administrative policy. If it is sufficient, it makes no
difference whether or not it is expressly stated in the statute. In
other words, the problem is not the presence or absence of guides,
but the sufficiency of those guides.
This classification explains the title of this article. There is
no real problem concerning the validity of an absolutely unguided
discretion. The problem arises when the discretion conferred is
apparently unguided (or insufficiently guided), either because no
guide is expressed or because the guide expressed appears to be
inadequate. The question is: "When is an apparently unguided
(or insufficiently guided) discretion valid?" or in another form,
"When is an apparently unguided (or insufficiently guided) dis-
cretion in fact unguided (or insufficiently guided) -which means
arbitrary and void?" 7
But what is the purpose of creating a discretionary administra-
tive body? What are the functions of such a body? The first
obvious function is to improve the administration of the law.
There are at least three reasons why such a discretionary body
tends to improve administration. One is that it introduces the
element of flexibility into the law.8 Abstract principles are no
longer applied as they would be to an abstract person.9 Admin-
istration is individualized and the doctrine of reasonableness is
introduced, making it possible to prevent unnecessary hardships
which would result from the enforcement of an inflexible rule of
law. An example is the power which most ordinances give to
zoning boards of appeal-the power to depart from the require-
ments of the ordinance in case of unnecessary hardships or prac-
7Several reasons have been advanced to account for the absence of express
statutory guides in so many instances. One is that the legislature intended
to allow the administrative authority to find its orn standards or be guided
by the circumstances of each case. Another is that the legislature appar-
ently intended there should be some qualification, or standard, or guide, but
failed to provide any, either because: (a) of carelessness, or (b) the grounds
of discretion were obvious, or (c) in statutes requiring official consent it pre-
sumably intended approval to be given as a matter of course in normal cases,
and to be withheld only in case there were something abnormal or irregular.
Freund, op. cit., n. 1.
8 Charles E. Hughes, Some Aspects of the Development of American Law
(1916) 39 Rep'ts N. Y. State Bar Ass'n. 269; Freund, op. cit., n. 1.




tical difficulties.' 0 A second reason is that it draws to the com-
plexities of administration the comprehensive knowledge and
technical skill of highly trained men in all fields of endeavor."
And the third is that it secures disinterested men of sound judg-
ment to apply broad legislative principles. 12
A second function of such a body is to evolve workable rules of
administration by means of the trial and error method. 13 An
authority with discretionary powers over the details of adminis-
tration is in a position to try one method and then another until
it arrives at a satisfactory one, whereas if the legislature were
compelled to fix the details in every statute it would be most diffi-
cult to get them changed. After a satisfactory rule has been
evolved by th6 administrative body there would be less objection
to embodying it in a statute.
A third function is to serve as a disguised method for setting
up a particular standard. There may be a desire to disguise the
standard either because it is a higher one than the public has yet
reached, or because it is a standard not fit to be set up as the
law of the land.14 The wisdom of disguising any standard is
doubtful, but it is utterly indefensible when the disguised stand-
ard is an improper one.
The problem of the scope of administrative discretion has two
distinct aspects: (a) the scope of administrative discretion as a
matter of constitutionality, and (b) the scope of administrative
discretion as a matter of policy. 15 It is the purpose of this article
to discuss the problem under the following heads:
10 Spencer-Sturla Co. v. Memphis (Tenn. 1927) 290 S. W. 608.
1 Charles E. Hughes, Address to Practitioners Before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, U. S. Daily, Nov. 1, 1930.
12 Charles E. Hughes, supra, n. 8.
is Freund, op. cit., n. 1. Such a function of an administrative body is
analogous to the theory sometimes advanced to the effect that the various
state legislatures serve as experimental laboratories for the national con-
gress, and for each other.
14 Freund, op. cit., n. 1.1" "The whole subject of administrative law is, on the threshold, one of
constitutionality, but beyond that it belongs to the field of statesmanship, and
not of law as administered by the courts." C. W. Pound, supra, n. 2.
The problem of policy has to do with the relative advantages and dangers
of discretionary administration. It is a question of reasonableness and
flexibility v. indifference of routine; a question of comprehensive knowledge,
technical skill, sound judgment, and disinterestedness v. the "arbitrariness
of an unintelligent or despotic bureaucracy." Charles E. Hughes, supra,
n. 11.
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1. The rule as ordinarily stated (distinguishing administrative
discretion in the regulation of an ordinary lawful business, in the
exercise of the police power, in the determination of personal fit-
ness, and in the regulation of a mere privilege). The soundness
of such a rule.
2. An analysis of the cases based on the constitutional doctrines
involved:
(a) Unguided administrative discretion and the delega-
tion of legislative power.
(b) Unguided administrative discretion and due process
of law or equal protection of law.
3. Unguided administrative discretion and judicial review.
CHAPTER II
The Rule in Regard to Unguided Administrative Discretion as
Ordinarily Stated
ORDINARY LAWFUL BUSINESS RULE
In State ex rel. v. City of Billings16 appears this statement:
"The generally accepted rule [is] that an ordinance [or statute]
which vests in public officials a discretion to grant or refuse, to
grant a license to carry on an ordinarily lawful business, without
.. being guided by specifically enumerated conditions to which
all persons similarly situated may knowingly conform, is invalid."
That is, the statute (or ordinance) itself must lay down the
standards which are to guide the public official in the exercise of
his discretion, when that discretion affects the right to engage in
an ordinarily lawful business.
It is the opinion of the writer that this so-called "rule" is not a
rule of law, which upon its face it purports to be, but is at best
nothing more than a rule of construction which the courts an-
nouncing it have decided to follow. That is, unless the statute
or ordinance lays down such standards, the courts have decided to
"(a) We may view with alarm the tendency to vest in administrative com-
missions drawn for political motives from an inexperienced public, power
over personal and property rights, or (b) we may welcome the substitution
of the regulatory power of trained officials for the unprofessional and un-
wieldy processes of the courts of law ... " C. W. Pound, supra, n. 2.
' (1927) 79 Mont. 25, 225 Pac. 11.
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construe it as an attempt to confer unqualified discretion-arbi-
trary discretion-and therefore void. The origin and develop-
ment of this "rule" are the basis of such an opinion:
As is the case with so many rules of law, the one under discus-
sion owes its origin to a dictum in an early case. In Bessonies v.
City of Indianapolis, decided in 1880,17 the court had under con-
sideration the validity of a city ordinance which made it unlaw-
ful to establish a hospital in the city without a license from the
common council and board of aldermen. After deciding that
under state law the city had no authority to regulate private hos-
pitals, the court made this statement: "The granting or refusal
of the license is not governed by any prescribed rules, but rests, in
such case, in the uncontrolled18 discretion of the common council
and board of aldermen." Thus, the court did nothing more than
construe the ordinance as an attempt to delegate unqualified, arbi-
trary discretion. The opinion continues: "if the ordinance is
valid [and means what it has just been construed to mean], the
common council and board of aldermen have it in their power
[i. e. they are authorized] to grant one person a license, and re-
fuse another under the same circumstances. No law could be
valid, which, by its terms would authorize the passage of such an
ordinance." The rule as first announced was based on this and
the following cases:
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Radecke19 the court declared invalid
an ordinance giving the mayor power to revoke any license to use
steam engines and steam boilers within the city. It did so on
the ground that the city had no authority to pass the ordinance.
It first construed the ordinance as an attempt to vest arbitrary
power in the mayor, and concluded: "We are of the opinion that
there may be an ordinance . . . so clearly unreasonable, so
arbitrary, oppressive or partial as to raise a presumption that
the legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and
to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain
abuse of authority."
In Barthet v. City of New Orleans20 the court issued an injunc-
tion pendente lite to restrain the enforcement against the plaintiff
' 71 Ind. 189.
18 Italics those of the present writer.
19 (1878) 79 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239.
20 (D. C. E. D. La. 1885) 24 F. 563.
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of an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of slaughtering
houses within prescribed limits without the permission of the city
council. The grounds for issuing the injunction were that (a) the
city had no power to pass such an ordinance, and (b) the power
attempted to be conferred on the council, if exercised as the de-
fendant admitted it intended to exercise it, would cause plaintiff
irreparable harm, and would tend to create a monopoly prohibited
by the constitution of Louisiana.
In Frazees' Case21 the court declared invalid an ordinance pro-
hibiting the use of the streets for the purpose of a parade without
a permit from the mayor, on the ground that (a) it suppressed
what was in general perfectly lawful, and (b) it vested the power
to make exceptions in an official with "unregulated" discretion-
i. e. the ordinance was construed as an attempt to confer arbitrary
discretion.
In 1886 the supreme court of the United States, in Yick Wo. v.
Hopkins, 2 2 had before it an ordinance making it unlawful for any-
one to operate a laundry in other than a brick or stone building
without the consent of the board of supervisors. The court dis-
charged the defendant on a writ of habeas corpus for violating the
ordinance, on the ground that the ordinance as enforced had re-
sulted in arbitrary discrimination against the defendant, and all
other Chinese engaged in the laundry business, and thereby de-
prived him of the equal protection of the law. However, the
court went farther and construed the ordinance as intended to
confer a naked and arbitrary power to withhold consent. So
construed the ordiance was invalid. "The very idea that one man
may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living . . .
at the mere will [unqualified discretion] of another, seems intol-
erable in any country whete freedom prevails, as being the es-
sence of slavery itself."
State v. Mahner23 merely followed the dictum in Yick Wo. v.
Hopkins. An ordinance authorizing the city council to grant or
refuse a license to conduct a dairy was construed as an attempt
to confer arbitrary discretion and was then declared invalid.
An ordinance of the city of Chicago prohibited the use of the
21 (1886) 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72.
22 118 U. S. 355.
23 (1891) 43 La. Ann. 496, 9 So. 480.
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streets for parades or processions without a permit from the
police department. The court in City of Chicago v. Trotter24 con-
strued the ordinance as an attempt to confer arbitrary discretion
and therefore void, saying: "It is subversive of the liberty of the
citizen, and outside the domain of law, that authority so arbitrary
should be lodged in one individual."
Upon the basis of these cases the "rule" was announced by the
Indiana court in City of Richmond v. Dudley.2 5 The case involved
an ordinance prohibiting the storage of inflammable oils in the
city without permission from the common council. The court
first construed the ordinance as intending to confer arbitrary or
unqualified discretion, and then said: "It seems clear from the
foregoing authorities to be well established that a municipal ordi-
nance placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use
of property must, in order to be valid, specify the rules and the
conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must
admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will
comply with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the
exercise, or the opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary dis-
crimination by the municipal authorities between citizens who
will so comply." The cases relied on do not support such a broad
statement. They merely show that when an ordinance vested
discretion in a public officer without laying down standards for its
guidance it was construed as an attempt to vest arbitrary power
in that officer. This case goes one step further and lays down the
proposition that such a construction is necessary.
Two later Indiana cases stated the rule a little more carefully.
In City of Elkhart v. Murray,2 6 the court said: "If an ordinance
upon its face restricts the right of dominion which the owner [of
property] might otherwise exercise without question, not accord-
ing to any uniform rule, but so as to make the absolute enjoyment
of his own [property] depend upon the will of the city authori-
ties, it is invalid because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of
action, and leaves the right of property subject to the will of such
authorities, who may exercise it so as to give exclusive profits or
privileges to particular persons." The court merely construed
24 (1891) 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359.
25 (1891) 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 13 L. R. A. 587.
26 (1905) 165 Ind. 304, 75 N. E. 593, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940.
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the failure to furnish a uniform rule of action as an attempt to
confer unqualified discretion. This is made even more clear by
the language of the same court in Park Hill Development Com-
pany v. City of Evansville :27 "It [the ordinance] is an attempt to
confer upon certain city officers the arbitrary 27a power to approve
or disapprove . . . for any reason they might choose, or upon
mere whim, without reason, and to take different action with re-
gard to different plats under like circumstances."
However, the broad statement of the Richmond v. Dudley
Case28 was taken over verbatim by the Kentucky court in City of
Monticello v. Bates.2 9 The court applied the "rule" and held that
the failure to specify "the rules and conditions to be observed"
made the statute invalid, but made no effort to examine the basis
of the "rule." This case was then quoted and followed in later
Kentucky cases without serious analysis. 30 The North Carolina
courts did the same thing.31
In Missouri the court followed this same line of cases, saying in
Hays v. Poplar Bluff :32 "It [an ordinance conferring discretion
without laying down guides] violates the principle inherent in
our constitutional system that when a municipal corporation
seeks to restrict for the public good the rights of the individual
otherwise incident to the ownership of property, it must do so by
a rule applicable to all alike under the same circumstances, and
can not make the enjoyment of his. own depend upon the arbi-
trary33 will of the municipal legislature." That necessarily im-
plied that the ordinance was first construed as an attempt to con-
fer arbitrary power. The same construction is given to an Iowa
ordinance: "An attempt is made by the ordinance to vest a dis-
cretion in the board of health which the law does not permit"-
that is, an arbitrary discretion.34
27 (1921) 190 Ind. 432, 130 N. E. 645.
27a Italics those of the present writer.
2 8 Supra, n. 25.
29 (1916) 169 Ky. 258, 183 S. W. 555.
so Bloomfield v. Bayne (1924) 206 Ky. 68, 266 S. W. 885; Slaughter v. Post
(1926) 214 Ky. 175, 282 S. W. 1091; Lovell v. Mt. Vernon (1926) 215 Ky. 143,
284 S. W. 1025.
31 State v. Tenant (1892) 110 N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387; Bizzell v. Goldsboro
(1926) 192 N. C. 348, 135 S. E. 50.
32 (1915) 263 Mo. 516, 173 S. W. 676, L. R. A. 1915D 595.
33 Italics those of the present writer.




The dictum of the court in Yick Wo. v. Hopkins35 also has been
widely quoted and followed. Ordinances which fail to lay down
express guides for the exercises of the discretion conferred are
construed to be an attempt to confer arbitrary discretionary
authority.3 6
Two Washington cases illustrate the point that it is when the
ordinance is construed as authorizing arbitrary power that it is
invalid. Such a construction follows when the ordinance lays
down no guides. "All those decisions were rested upon the prin-
ciple that an ordinance which authorizes the issuing or withhold-
ing of a license to engage in a lawful business, that is, a business
which within itself is ordinarily perfectly lawful, and [commits]
to any officer or set of officers the power to decide according to
their own notions in each particular case the question of the
propriety of issuing or withholding a license therefor . . . is
authorizing the exercise of arbitrary power." 37  Of course, the
question is whether the ordinance does confer such power. That
point seems to be assumed, as it was when the same court said:
"The business of conducting a pharmacy or drug store in this
state is a lawful business, under the laws of this state, and there-
fore neither the state nor the city, under the guise of regulation,
may delegate to any person or set of persons, the right to arbi-
trarily designate one who may enter the business and in their dis-
cretion reject another equally qualified." 38
In each case in which this "rule" has been announced as the
basis of the decision the ordinance had already been construed as
an attempt to confer arbitrary power.3 9 This point is made very
clear in State v. Coleman.40 The court had before it an ordinance
which prohibited the use of the public square for making speeches
3 Supra. n. 22.
In re Garrabad (1893) 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104; Sioux Falls v. Kirby
(1894) 6 S. D. 62, 60 N. W. 156; Walsh v. Denver (1898) 11 Colo. App. 523,
53 Pac. 458; Tulsa v. Thomas (1923) 89 Okla. 188, 214 Pac. 1070.
37 State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court (1920) 113 Wash. 296, 193 Pac.
845.
38 Seattle v. Gibson (1917) 96 Wash. 425, 165 Pac. 109; Vincent v. Seattle
(1921) 115 Wash. 475, 197 Pac. 618.
39 City Council of Montgomery v. West (1907) 149 Ala. 311, 42 So. 1000;
State ex rel. v. Town of Ripley (1924) 95 W. Va. 521, 121 S. E. 725; Mayor
v. B. & 0. R. Co. (1908) 107 Md. 178,68 Atl. 490; Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero
(1898) 176 Ill. 9; Anderson v. City of Wellington (1888) 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac.
719, 2 L. R. A. 110.
40 (1921) 96 Conn. 190, 113 Atl. 385.
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without a permit from the chief of police. The court frankly
recognized that the statute could be upheld by reading into it an
implied guide of reasonableness, or a presumption that the chief
of police would not act arbitrarily (which means that the chief of
police could not act arbitrarily and within the limits of the
ordinance at the same time). It also recognized that this con-
struction had been sanctioned by the federal courts.41 However
the court refused to adopt such construction, and instead followed
that line of state decisions construing the failure to provide ex-
press standards as an attempt to confer arbitrary power.
THE POLICE POWER RULE, OR NECESSITY RULE
The ordinary lawful business rule "is subject to the qualifica-
tion that where it is impractical to lay down a definite or all-
comprehensive rule, or when the ordinance relates to the adminis-
tration of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the gen-
eral welfare, morals, and safety of the public, it is not essential
to the validity of the ordiance that it prescribe all the conditions
upon which such license shall be granted or refused." 42
The key word in this exception to the rule appears to be the
word "necessary." In the exercise of its police power the legis-
lature sometimes finds it impossible or impracticable to specify
standards any more definite than the standard which the courts
will imply-the standard of reasonableness. Thus in order to
exercise its police power at all in regard to such situations it must
of necessity confer a discretion which is apparently unguided, or
apparently insufficiently guided (if the legislature sees fit to ex-
press the standard which would have been implied).
Thus, in State ex rel. v. Whitman,43 the court had before it a
statute which provided that no rule or regulation of an insurance
rating bureau (which was required by law) should be in force
before it was filed with the state insurance commissioner, or after
he disapproved it. The statute was attacked on the ground that
it conferred an arbitrary and unguided discretion upon the in-
surance commissioner. The court held: (a) that because of the
41 State ex rel. Lieberman v. Van DeCarr, post, n. 69.
42 State ex rel. v. City of Billings, supra, n. 16; Gorieb v. Fox (1926) 145
Va. 554, 134 S. E. 914.
43 (1928) 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929.
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nature of the subject matter dealt with it would be impossible or
impracticable to establish a more definite standard for the guid-
ance of the action of the insurance commissioner than the stand-
ard of "reasonable" action, and (b) that the standard of reason-
ableness need not be expressed in the statute, but would be im-
plied. "The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law, and the
action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature
of things be subject to the test of reasonableness. While the
statute does not in terms provide that the commissioner of insur-
ance shall exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in the dis-
approval of proposed rules and regulations, that condition is nec-
essarily implied."
And in considering the validity of a statute which required cer-
tain designated classes of buildings to be equipped with fire
escapes, but authorized the factory inspector to determine the
number and the location, and the construction of the fire escapes,
an Illinois court said: 44 "It is impossible for the legislature to
describe in detail how many fire escapes shall be provided, how
they shall be constructed, and where they shall be located in order
to serve the purpose of protecting the lives of the occupants-in
view of the varied location, construction, and surroundings of
buildings." It was therefore necessary to leave the matter to the
discretion of the inspector.
A Pennsylvania statute required owners of adjoining coal prop-
erties to leave along the boundary line pillars of coal of sufficient
size to constitute an adequate barrier for the protection of em-
ployees of either mine should the other be abandoned and allowed
to fill with water, the size of the pillar to be determined in each
case by an administrative body. The court upheld the statute
on the theory that it would be impossible for the size to be fixed in
the statute, saying: "From this it results that it was competent
for the legislature to lay down a general rule and then establish
an administrative tribunal with authority to fix the precise width
or thickness of the pillar that will suit the necessities of the situa-
tion and constitute a compliance with the general rule." 44a
44 Arms v. Ayer (1901) 192 Ill. 221, 61 N. E. 851. This case is quoted at
great length, and followed in Chicago v. Washington Home (1919) 289 Ill.
206, 124 N. E. 416.
44a Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pa. (1914) 232 U. S. 531.
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This principle of "necessity" is forcefully set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Gorieb v. Fox.45 The court was
considering the validity of a zoning ordinance which fixed a build-
ing line, but reserved to the city council power to make exceptions.
It said: "In laying down a general rule, such as the one with
which we are here concerned, the practical impossibility of an-
ticipating in advance and providing in specific terms for every
exceptional case which may arise, is apparent. And yet the in-
clusion of such cases may well result in great and needless hard-
ship, entirely disproportionate to the good which will result from
a literal enforcement of the general rule. . . . We think it en-
tirely plain that the reservation of authority in the present ordi-
nance to deal in a special manner with such exceptional cases is
unassailable upon constitutional grounds." The court was merely
affirming the principle it had announced years before when con-
sidering the validity of an ordinance of the City of St. Louis pro-
hibiting the establishment of cow stables in the city without per-
mission of the municipal assembly. It had said then: "It would
be exceedingly difficult to make exceptions in the ordinance itself
without doing injustice in individual cases, and we see no diffi-
culty in vesting in some body of men, presumed to be acquainted
with the business and its conditions, the power to grant permits in
special cases."' 46
In Monongahela Bridge Company v. United States, 47 the court
upheld an act of Congress 48 empowering the Secretary of War,
when satisfied after a hearing of the parties interested that a
bridge over a navigable waterway of the United States was an
"unreasonable" obstruction, to order changes, on the theory that
"any other method was impractical, in view of the vast and varied
interests of the nation requiring legislation from time to time."
Congress could not possibly act in each case.
However, there are several cases which apply this exception to
the so-called general rule without any reference to the principle
of necessity. The court merely construes the discretion as sub-
ject to the implied guide of reasonableness, and then holds that
45 (1927) 274 U. S. 603.
46 Fischer v. St. Louis (1904) 194 U. S. 361.
47 (1909) 216 U. S. 117.
48 Act of Mar. 3, 1899, 3 Stat. at L. 1121.
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such discretion is not arbitrary. There is either no discussion of
the "necessity" of omitting express standards, or the discussion
is obviously a subterfuge. An excellent example is the case of
Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Utility Commission.50
A Wisconsin statute imposed on public utility companies the cost
of their regulation, but provided that the Public Utility Commis-
sion could exempt a company from the requirement upon a find-
ing that the "public interest" required it. The court upheld the
statute, and though it makes the statement that "the legislature
realizes the impossibility of anticipating and providing for every
special situation involved in the question of what the public inter-
est requires," it is difficult to conceive of the possibility that the
court intended the sentence to be taken literally. It is the sole
function of a legislature to look after the "public interests" of
its constituents. Of course it is impossible for the legislature or
anyone else to foresee the future requirements of the public. If
it were not, there would be no need for future sessions of the
legislature. Having determined and provided for all future needs
it could adjourn indefinitely. It cannot be that the inability of
the legislature to foresee what the public interest will require in
the future necessitates the conference of discretionary powers
upon an administrative officer, for the conclusion from such a
premise is inevitable: the inability of the legislature to determine
what the public interest requires in the present must create the
same "necessity." There is no "necessity" for unguided dis-
cretion.
However the court holds that the commission's discretion is not
an arbitrary one. Though the power of the legislature to de-
49 For other cases in which this same principle is applied see: State ex rel.
v. Duval County (1918) 76 Fla. 180, 76 So. 692; Ex parte Holmes (1921) 187
Calif. 640, 203 Pac. 398; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Ill. (1901), 185 U. S. 203;
Hyma v. Seeger (1926) 233 Mich. 659, 207 N. W. 834; Taylor v. Roberts
(1922) 84 Fla. 654, 94 So. 874; Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Comm.
(1933) 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691; Peo. ex rel. v. Van DeCarr (1903)
175 N. Y. 440, 67 N. E. 913, affirmed (1905) 199 U. S. 522; Yee Bow v. Cleve-
land (1919) 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. E. 132; U. S. v. Shreveport Grain and
Elevator Co. (1932) 287 U. S. 77; Black v. City of Chicago (1909) 239 Ill.
251, 87 N. E. 1011; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission (1915)
236 U. S. 230; Peo. v. Harley (1925) 230 Mich. 276, 203 N. W. 531; Buffalo
v. Hill (1903) 79 App. Div. 402, 79 N. Y. S. 449; Spencer-Sturla Co. v. Mem-
phis (Tenn. 1927) 290 S. W. 608; Peo. v. Globe Grain and Milling Co. (1930)
8 Calif. Dec. 625, 294 Pac. 3.
(1932) 206 Wis. 589, 240 N. W. 411.
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termine what constitutes the public interest is an arbitrary power,
the power lodged in the commission falls short of such arbitrari-
ness. The commission is required to exercise a reasonable judg-
ment as to what shall constitute the public interest, and its judg-
ment is subject to the judicial test of reasonableness.
The Case of Cutsinger v. City of Atlantar' involved the validity
of a statute conferring on the municipal council power to grant
or refuse a. license for a hotel. The court said: "From these
cases it will appear that the conferring of discretionary power to
grant or refuse a license in occupations subject to police licenses
is not per se in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States on the ground that the exact
terms on which the discretion is to be exercised are not prescribed
. . ." because there is no attempt to confer arbitrary power,
"and if the power is sought to be arbitrarily or wrongfully exer-
cised the courts will apply a remedy." There is no discussion of
"inecessity."
In Blackman Health Resort v. Atlantar,2 the court said: "An
act of the legislature, in general terms conferring power to control,
regulate, and in its discretion prohibit the erection of buildings
of the character mentioned, [hotels] without prescribing the
bounds of such discretion, will not ipso facto render the grant of
power void as being an effort to confer arbitrary power, but will
be treated as authorizing the municipal authority to exercise a
reasonable discretion." There is no discussion of "necessity." 53
What is the effect of the inclusion of the word "necessity" in
the exception? "Unguided" discretion must be necessary for
what? For the best possible administration or only for a reason-
ably good administration? The standards used by the legislature
vary in degree of definiteness; would the possibility of using a
slightly more definite standard invalidate the use of a slightly
less definite one? These are the questions which will be considered
later.
-51 (1914) 142 Ga. 555, 83 S. E. 263.
52 (1921) 151 Ga. 507, 107 S. E. 525.
53 Tarpey v. McClure (1923) 190 Calif. 593, 213 Pac. 983; San Antonio v.
Rubin (C. C. A. 5, 1930) 42 F. (2d) 107; Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond
(1911) 224 U. S. 160; State v. Yopp (1887) 97 N. C. 477, 2 S. E. 458; Engel
v. O'Malley (1911) 219 U. S. 128; Ex parte Weisburg (Calif. 1932) 12 Pac.
(2d) 446; Redmond and Co. v. Michigan Securities Commission (1923) 222
Mich. 1, 192 N. W. 688.
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It should not be assumed that by reading into any statute the
guide of reasonableness the validity of the statute can be saved.
The guide of reasonableness must take its meaning from the
policy of the statute. Thus, if the statute does not declare a pol-
icy, the guide of reasonableness has no meaning. That was the
situation in Klein v. Barry.5 4 The Wisconsin blue sky law made
the sale of every security issued in violation of the act voidable at
the discretion of the commissioner. The implied guide of reason-
ableness could be of no assistance for there was no policy from
which it could take its meaning.55
THE PERSONAL FITNESS RULE
As a second exception to the ordinary lawful business rule it is
sometimes said that no express statutory guides are necessary
when the discretion has to do with the determination of the per-
sonal fitness of an applicant for a license.
This is really nothing more than a special application of the
police power exception, for the decisions upholding statutes or
ordinances conferring this type of discretion do so by implying
the guide of reasonableness, thereby preventing a construction of
the statute as an attempt to confer arbitrary power.56 Some of
them also say it is impossible to lay down in the statute express
guides for determining personal fitness.57 This type of discretion
11 (1923) 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457.
55 See also Peo. v. Klinck Packing Co. (1915) 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278;
Hoyt Bros. v. Grand Rapids (1932) 260 Mich. 447, 245 N. V. 509.
56 State ex rel. Mackey v. Hyde (1926) 315 Mo. 681, 286 S. W. 363; Racine
v. District Court (1916) 39 R. I. 475, 98 Atl. 97; Douglas v. Noble (1923) 261
U. S. 165; Peo. v. Kettles (1906) 221 Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472; Dillard v. State
Board of Medical Examiners (1921) 69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866; Ex parte
McManus (1907) 151 Calif. 331, 90 Pac. 702; Lehman v. State Board of Ac-
countancy (1923) 263 U. S. 394; State v. De Verges (1923) 153 La. 349, 95
So. 805; State ex rel. v. Bond (1924) 96 W. Va. 193, 122 S. E. 539; Leach v.
Daugherty (1925) 73 Calif. App. 83, 238 Pac. 160; Rizzo v. Douglas (1923)
121 Misc. 446, 201 N. Y. S. 194; Taylor v. Smith (1924) 140 Va. 217, 124
S. E. 259; State v. Cohen (1906) 73 N. H. 543, 63 Atl. 928; Gundling v. Chi-
cago (1899) 177 U. S. 183; Walker v. Birmingham (1927) 216 Ala. 206, 112
So. 823; Sumner v. Ward (1923) 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502; Minces v.
Schoenig (1898) 72 Minn. 528, 75 N. W. 711; Mathews v. Murphy (1901) 23
Ky. 750, 63 S. W. 785; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors (1905) 25
App. D. C. 443.
5' Milwaukee v. Rissling (1924) 184 Wis. 517, 199 N. W. 61; McBride v.
Clark (1925) 101 N. J. L. 213, 127 Atl. 550; Peo. v. Flanigam (1932) 347 Ill.
328, 179 N. E. 823; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 539, L. R. A.
1917F 514; Ex parte Whitley (1904) 144 Calif. 167, 77 Pac. 879; Contra:
Peo. v. Beekman (1931) 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E. 435.
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is conferred in statutes requiring licenses for teachers, dentists,
physicians, electrical contractors, insurance brokers, motor ve-
hicle drivers, public accountants, architects, security brokers,
junk dealers, cigarette dealers, milk dealers, peddlers, employ-
ment agencies. 5 8
THE PRIVILEGE RULE
A rule entirely distinct and separate from the ordinary lawful
business rule is that which the writer has chosen to call the priv-
ilege rule. It is to the effect that when the discretion conferred
has to do with the regulation of a mere privilege, as distinguished
from a matter of right, such as the engagement in an ordinary law-
ful business, it is not necessary that the statute conferring the
discretion provide express guides.
The great weight of authority supports this rule, 9 and the
reasons are fairly obvious. Except upon the theory that the
statute is an invalid delegation of legislative power (which will
be discussed later) there is no way to attack the validity of the
statute. It deals with a "privilege," which means that no one
has a "right" protected by the Constitution to perform the act
regulated. The point can best be illustrated by the following
quotations:
"A distinction must be observed between the regulation of
an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and
one carried on by governmental sufferance or permission.
In the latter case the power to exclude altogether generally
includes the lesser power to condition, and may justify a de-
gree of regulation not admissible in the former." 0
"It is universally recognized . . . that there is in it
[a license to exercise a mere privilege] no element of prop-
erty right or vested interest of any kind. Being so, it may
58 Cases cited in notes 56 and 57.
59 State v. City of Olympia (1922) 122 Wash. 239, 210 Pac. 371; Lane v.
Whitaker (D. C. D. Conn. 1921) 275 F. 476; Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood
(1899) 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686; Mehlos v. Milwaukee (1914) 156 Wis. 591,
146 N. W. 882; Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Calif. 1, 251 Pac. 784;
State eg Tel. Lane v. Fleming (1924) 129 Wash. 646, 225 Pac. 647; State v.
Sherow (1912) 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866; State ex Tel. Sayles v. Superior
Court (1922) 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966; Rowland v. State (1922) 104 Ohio
State 366, 135 N. E. 622; Dwyer v. Peo. (1927) 82 Colo. 574, 261 Pac. 858;
Crowley v. Christensen (1890) 137 U. S. 86.
60 Packard v. Banton (1924) 264 U. S. 140, approving Davis v. Mass.
(1896) 167 U. S. 43.
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be a necessary consequence that rules of law, protective of
vested rights, are without influence in respect of such a
privilege. It would seem axiomatic that even one who is, as
he conceives, wrongfully denied participation in a matter of
mere privilege, or who is discriminated against in his effort
or desire to enjoy that privilege with another no better en-
titled, has no firm basis of complaint." 61
"The question is not whether someone else has been (or will
be) favored. The question is whether the petitioner has
been illegally oppressed." 6 2
How could anyone be oppressed when no right of his is in-
volved?
It is difficult to quarrel with this rule, for there is no way to
subject the regulation to the provisions of the Fourteenth or Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 63
SOUNDNESS OF THESE RULES
The quintessence of the foregoing discussion may be expressed
in two simple statements: First, when a statute or ordinance
confers upon an administrative body discretionary powers in the
regulation of a mere privilege, no express standards for the guid-
ance of the discretion are necessary. Second, when a statute or
ordinance confers upon an administrative body discretionary
powers in the regulation of an ordinary lawful business, express
standards must be established by the statute or ordinance itself,
unless the statute or ordinance is an exercise of the police power
and express standards are not practicable (and when the regula-
tion is made to turn upon the question of personal fitness no stand-
ard is practicable).
There is no intention to criticise the first of these propositions,
but the second is open to serious objection. In the first place,
bl State v. Montgomery (1912) 177 Ala. 212, 59 So. 294.
62 Matter of Larkin Co. v. Schwab (1926) 242 N. Y. 330, 151 N. E. 637.
63 Some of the cases get the same result by applying the police power rule,
implying the guide of reasonableness and holding that sufficient: Eureka City
v. Wilson (1897) 15 Utah 53, 48 Pac. 41; State v. Pocohontas County Court
(1923) 92 W. Va. 222, 114 S. E. 519; Brunswicke-Balke-Callender Co. v.
Menklenburg County (1921) 181 N. C. 386, 107 S. E. 317; Lloyd v. Ramsey
(1921) 192 Ia. 103, 183 N. W. 333; Oakley v. Richards (1918) 275 Mo. 266,
204 S. W. 505; Peo. v. Grant (1891) 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 964.
Other cases ignore the question of privilege and apply the ordinary law-
ful business rule: Devereaux v. Township Board (1920) 211 Mich. 38, 177
N. W. 967; Village of Little Chute v. VanCamp (1908) 136 Wis. 526, 117
N. W. 1012.
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when the cases are classified according to their factual set-ups
they cannot be reconciled upon the basis of this rule. For ex-
ample, some courts, when considering ordinances regulating
theatres and motion picture films, applied the necessity rule,64
while another applied the privilege rule, 6 and still another ap-
plied the ordinary lawful business rule.66 In considering an
ordinance regulating the sale of meat one court applied the police
power rule67 while another applied the ordinary lawful business
rule.68 In considering an ordinance regulating the sale of milk
one court applied the police power rule 69 while another applied
the ordinary lawful business rule.70 In considering an ordinance
regulating physicians' licenses one court applied the ordinary
lawful business rule7 ' while another applied the personal fitness
rule.72 In considering an ordinance regulating laundries one
court applied the ordinary lawful business rule78 while another
applied the necessity rule.74 In considering ordinances regulat-
ing filling stations and the storage of oil some courts applied the
ordinary lawful business rule70 while others applied the police
power rule,76 and still others applied the privilege rule.77 One
court applied the necessity rule to an ordinance regulating cow
stables78while another applied the ordinary lawful business rule.79
In considering an ordinance regulating hospitals one court ap-
64 Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indust. Comm., supra, n. 49; Black v. City of
Chicago, supra, n. 49.
85 Oakley v. Richards, supra, n. 63.
16 Vincent v. Seattle, supra, n. 38. The ordinance applied to all amuse-
ments and was not restricted to theatres.
67 City of Buffalo v. Hill, supra, n. 49.
68 Walsh v. Denver, supra, n. 36.69 Peo. ex rel. Lieberman v. Van DeCarr (1903) 175 N. Y. 440, 67 N. E.
913, (1905) 199 U. S. 552.
70 Bear v. Cedar Rapids, supra, n. 34.
71 Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners (1906) 148 Calif. 590, 84 Pac. 39.
72 Dillard v. State Board, supra, n. 56; Mathews v. Murphy, supra, n. 56;
Czarra v. Board, supra, n. 56.
73 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, n. 22.
7 Yee Bow v. Cleveland, supra, n. 49.
75 Bizzell v. Goldsboro, supra, n. 31; Slaughter v. Post, supra, n. 30; City
of Richmond v. Dudley, supra, n. 25.
76 Hyma v. Seeger, supra, n. 49; San Antonio v. Rubin, supra, n. 53.
77 State ex rel. Lane v. Fleming, supra, n. 59; Matter of Larkin Co. v.
Schwab, supra, n. 62.
78 Fischer v. St. Louis, supra, n. 46.
79 State v. Mahner, supra, n. 23; Mayor v. B. and 0. R. Co. (1908) 107 Md.
178, 68 Atl. 490.
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plied the ordinary lawful business rule8o while another applied
the police power rule.81 When one comes to ordinances regulat-
ing the use of streets he finds the courts at variance on every point.
The use of the streets for the purpose of making speeches has been
subjected to both the ordinary lawful business rule82 and the
privilege rule.83 The use of the streets for parades has been sub-
jected to the ordinary lawful business rule 84 while the ordinary
use of the streets for traffic has been subjected to the police power
rule.85 The use of the streets by busses and transportation com-
panies has been subjected to both the ordinary lawful business
rule 6 and the police power rule.87
In the second place, there are many cases in which the court
announced the ordinary lawful business rule with approval, and
then proceeded to find that the discretion was guided, though it is
difficult to see how the statute was any more definite in providing
guides than were the statutes in those cases which applied the
rule strictly. In Farmers' and Planters' Company v. Mayor of
Salisbury,8 8 the court considered an ordinance which prohibited
the erection of any building without a permit from the mayor,
the application for which must be in writing, stating the proposed
location, size of building, materials to be used, and the purpose of
the building. The court held that the ordinance provided guides
because it specified the various matters to be taken into con-
sideration in the exercise of the discretion. Was the mayor's dis-
cretion any more guided than it would have been had the contents
of the application not been specified? Though the ordinance re-
quired him to consider the size of the building, what then? It
did not say what he should decide about the size. Would he not
necessarily have considered the size had the ordinance remained
80 Bessonies v. Ind., supra, n. 18.
81 Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta, supra, n. 52.
82 State v. Coleman, supra, n. 40.
82 Davis v. Mass., supra, n. 60.
84 Frazee's Case, supra, n. 21; Chicago v. Trotter, supra, n. 24; In re Garra-
bad, supra, n. 36; Anderson v. City of Wellington, supra, n. 39.85 State v. Yopp, supra, n. 53; Taylor v. Roberts, supra, n. 49; Ashland
Trans. Co. v. State Tax Comm. (1933) 247 Ky. 144, 56 S. W. (2d) 691.86 Tulsa v. Thomas, supra, n. 36.
87 Lane v. Whitaker, supra, n. 59; Racine v. District Court, supra, n. 56;
Rizzo v. Douglas, supra, n. 56.
88 (1920) 136 Md. 617, 111 Atl. 112.
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silent upon the subject? It seems that the court merely wished
to evade the rule it announced without repudiating the rule.
In Moy w. Chicago,8 9 the court considered an ordinance regu-
lating the operation of laundries. One section gave the mayor
power to revoke a license to operate a laundry if satisfied that its
maintenance was dangerous to the health of the city or of persons
employed in the laundry. The court held that the ordinance
provided guides for the" exercise of this discretion because the
section was to be construed as giving the mayor authority to re-
voke a license only when the laundry was being operated in viola-
tion of "specific provisions" of the ordinance designed to protect
the health and safety of the employees and the public. The
statute expressed no such guide. When the court gave it such a
construction did it do any less than it would have done had it
merely implied the guide of reasonableness? The court wanted
to uphold the ordinance, but did not want to repudiate the "rule,"
so it proceeded to find that the ordinance expressed guides90
In the third place, the rule as stated, followed by an exception
which all but destroys the rule, is ambiguous. Any regulation of
an ordinary lawful business must be done by virtue of an exercise
of the police power. There is no other way. Why, then, state an
"ordinary lawful business rule" when there is an exception which
covers all exercises of the police power?
The rule with its exception amounts to nothing more than a
statement that the guide fixed in the statute must be as definite as
practicable. Such a statement is unsatisfactory. Practicable
for what? The definiteness of a standard is merely a matter of
degree. If a standard of one degree of definiteness is "prac-
ticable" in order to secure a reasonably good administration of
the law, is a standard of a slightly lower degree of definiteness not
"practicable" even though it tends to secure a superior adminis-
tration of the law? Would the lack of any standard at all be
"impracticable" or "unnecessary" even though it tended to secure
the best possible administration, if a more definite standard would
tend to secure a fairly good administration? These questions
cannot be answered on the basis of the "rule" and its exception.
89 (1923) 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845.
90 See also Slovanian Literature Ass'n v. Portland (1924) 111 Ore. 335,
224 Pac. 1098; Hughes v. Detroit (1922) 217 Mich. 567, 187 N. W. 530; Lovell
v. Mt. Vernon (1926) 215 Ky. 143, 284 S. W. 1025.
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But accepting the rule for what it is worth, is it sound? What
is it that requires the standard to be as definite as possible? This
question requires an examination of the constitutional problems
involved in all these cases. It is extremely doubtful whether they
support such a rule. The question will be discussed in a later
chapter.
In the fourth place, it is assumed that the lack of any definite
guide expressed in the statute is a means of conferring the widest
possible discretion. That was the theory of the early cases-if
the guide was expressed by the statute the discretion was un-
guided, uncontrolled, arbitrary. But it has already been shown
that when the absence of express guides is "necessary" the guide
of reasonableness is implied. In a later part of the article an at-
tempt will be made to show that a discretion guided by the im-
plied (or expressed) standard of reasonableness is often less
broad in scope than is a discretion guided by more definite stand-
ards--that is, that an apparently unguided discretion in some
cases tends to become non-discretionary.
Since it is the belief of the writer that the "rule" as ordinarily
stated . . . "is an inadequate analysis of the problem of ap-
parently unguided administrative discretion," it is next proposed
to consider the constitutional problems involved, for the purpose
of attempting to discover whether such discretion is or is not con-
stitutional, and to consider whether or not its conference conforms
to sound legislative practice.
CHAPTER III
Unguided Administrative Discretion and the Delegation of
Legislative Power
One of the first attacks upon statutes conferring discretionary
powers was on the ground that the statute violated the principle
that the legislature can not delegate its powers. Its powers were
given to it by the people and are held in trust. It can not delegate
those powers to another without violating that trust. Delegata
potestas non potest delegari.91 This doctrine is a corollary of
that theory of government known as the separation of powers,
91 Duff & Whiteside: Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari (1929) 14
Cornell L. Q. 168.
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upon the basis of which the Constitutions of the United States and
of every state in the United States were framed. All the powers
of government are divided between three departments, the legis-
lative, the executive, and the judicial, and the powers conferred
upon one department may neither be exercised by either of the
other departments nor delegated to any other body, except as
expressly authorized in the constitution. This doctrine of sep-
aration and non-delegation of the powers of government has be-
come firmly embodied in our legal system-as a matter of theory.
But in the practical operation of government the doctrine has
been subjected to severe criticism on all sides. The theory as
strictly applied simply has not worked. Rosenberry, J., speaking
for the court in State ex reZ. v. Whitman,92 said: "there never
was and never can be such a thing in the practical administration
of the law as a complete, absolute, scientific -separation of the
so-called co-ordinate governmental powers. As a matter of fact
they are, and always have been overlapping. Courts make rules
of procedure which in many instances at least might be prescribed
by the legislature. When courts through a receiver reach out
and administer a great railway system extending from one ocean
to the other, they are not exercising a strictly judicial power;
they are exercising an administrative or executive power, which
historically has found its way into the judicial department. The
constitution reserves to the legislature the power to act as a
court in certain cases; when it acts as such it exercises a judicial
power. . . . The essential facts upon which courts, legis-
latures, and executives, as well as students of the law, agree, is
that there is an overpowering necessity for a modification of the
doctrine of separation and non-delegation of the powers of
government."
This element of necessity has clearly been the main basis for
the continued attack upon the doctrine. At the time the con-
stitutions were written the distribution of powers provided for
was no doubt adequate. But "as any community passes from
simple to complex conditions the only way in which a government
can deal with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by the dele-
gation of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate agents,
92 (1928) 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929.
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subject to the control of general directions prescribed by superior
authority."9 3 In the face of necessity the inevitable must hap-
pen. It did. The legislatures delegated power and the courts
upheld their action. In the words of Elihu Root,9 4 "the old
doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has vir-
tually retired from the field and given up the fight."
However, the courts were not willing to repudiate the doctrine
openly or in its entirety. It had become too integral a part of
American political theory. The result was that the "formula"
was repeated over and over, but its scope was qualified and cut
down until not much remained. The judges and commentators
had no hesitancy in announcing the general doctrine that legis-
lative power could not be delegated, but when it came to applying
that doctrine the courts had no alternative; they were forced to
be guided by the necessities of government. As was said in
State ex rel. v. Whitman,95 "the courts recognized the situation,
and under one pretext or another upheld laws in recent years that
undeniably would have been held unconstitutional under condi-
tions which existed prior to the Civil War." 96
An adequate conception of the change which has been brought
about in this doctrine of non-delegation of power may be had by
considering the beginning of the process and its present stage.
The first inroads upon the scope of the theory were made by
what is known as the contingency doctrine, which is that the
legislature may pass a law, but make its operation depend upon
the existence of a fact, the determination of which is left to an-
other agency. The first case involving a statute of this kind
93 Elihu Root, A. B. A. Rep'ts. (1916) 368; Leek, Legislative Reference
Bureau (1925).
94 Ibid.
95 Supra, n. 92.
96 The same theory as to the changing concepts of the scope of the appli-
cation of constitutional doctrines is forcefully enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272
U. S. 365 (though the constitutional doctrine under consideration was a dif-
ferent one) :
"Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained,
a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected.
Such regulations are sustained [because of] the complex conditions of our
day .... and in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of con-
stitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must ex-
pand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are con-
stantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it
is impossible that it should be otherwise."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
which reached the courts was the Brig Aurora. 7 An act of Con-
gress provided that the non-intercourse acts should be revived if
the President issued a proclamation declaring that either France
or Great Britain had not revoked or modified certain edicts so
that they ceased to violate neutral trade. The statute was at-
tacked upon the theory that by making the revival of a statute
depend upon the proclamation of the President, the President
was given legislative power. The statute was upheld on the
ground that Congress had enacted a complete law which was to
become effective upon the occurrence of a subsequent event-
the failure of France to revoke an edict; someone had to de-
termine the existence of that event, and it need not be the legis-
lature. The President did not make the law. His proclamation
was merely evidence of a fact upon which the operation of the
law depended.
Marshall Field v. Clark98 involved the same situation. Con-
gress enacted a statute imposing specified duties upon certain im-
ported products, but the duties were not to become effective un-
less the country from which those products were imported levied
reciprocally unequal duties upon United States products of the
same nature. Whether or not a country levied such duties was
to be determined by the President. The court upheld the statute,
saying: "To deny this [the power to delegate the function of de-
termining the existence of facts upon which the operation of the
statute was made to depend] would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and use-
ful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law
making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside the halls of legislation." That is often the
only way the legislature can act wisely in regard to "a state of af-
fairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know."
In Hampton and Company v. United States,09 the court con-
sidered the validity of the flexible clause in the Tariff Act of 1922,
which gave the President power to raise or lower the duty on
specified articles so as to equalize the cost of producing that
article abroad and transporting it to this country and the cost
97 (1813) 7 Cranch 382.
98 (1891) 143 U. S. 649.
99 (1928) 276 U. S. 394.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/1
UNGUIDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
of producing the article here. The court upheld the statute, and
again applied the contingency doctrine. That is, Congress de-
termined what the duty should be: it should be sufficient to
equalize the costs of production. What the exact figure should
be in any particular case depended merely upon the calculations,
and that could be left to another body. The President was not
given the power to determine the duty. He was only given power
to determine facts, and when he had done so the statute operated
to fix the duty.
These three cases all apply the contingency doctrine-a com-
plete statute in praesenti to become effective in futuro upon the
happening of a specified event, the fact of its happening to be de-
termined by some agency other than the legislature. But their
effect is vastly different. In the first case the "fact" which de-
termined the operation of the statute was the revocation of a
French or British edict. In determining that "fact" the Presi-
dent exercised no discretion. In the second case the "fact" was
the levy of a duty by a foreign country that made the duties re-
ciprocally unequal. In determining the existence of that "fact"
the President was given some room for judgment of his own. But
in the third case the "fact" which the President was to determine
was the cost of production of a particular article both abroad
and in the United States. The cost of production of a given
article is most difficult to determine. There are a great many
factors to be considered and the importance of each factor varies
with the circumstances. Though the statute specified the factors
to be considered it did not, and could not, specify the influence
each factor should have upon the final determination. The
President is required to make a determination which involves the
use of a wide discretion. It is one thing to determine the revo-
cation of an edict and quite another to determine the cost of
production of an article. The one involves the exercise of no
discretion, and the other involves the exercise of a very great
discretion. Yet in both cases the President is merely determin-
ing the existence of a "fact" upon which the operation of the
statute depends.
In theory the contingency doctrine involves no problem of ad-
ministrative discretion. The theory works out in practice only
so long as the "fact" to be determined is definite, objective, and
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subject to absolute determination. But where the "fact" is some-
thing concerning which opinions differ the problems of discretion
become important. A very simple illustration will serve as an
example: suppose an ordinance prohibits the operation of a taxi-
cab by anyone without a driver's license, and requires the mayor
to issue a license to everyone whom he finds "as a matter of fact"
to be a competent driver. Are there many things more contro-
versial than the competency of an automobile driver?10 0 Thus,
by means of the contingency doctrine the legislature began to dele-
gate functions once exercised by it. That doctrine was carried
far.10 1
Without attempting to trace the complete history of the doctrine
of non-delegation of power, what is its status today? It is not
difficult to state: In its very briefest terms it is that the legislative
or policy forming power is its only non-delegable power. The
legislature has two kinds of power: one is its exclusively legis-
lative power, which can not be delegated; the other is its non-
exclusively legislative power, which it may either exercise di-
rectly or delegate to subordinate bodies. The only exclusively
legislative power is the power to determine basic policies. All
other powers may be delegated.
"The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law;
to fix limits within which the law shall operate-is a power
which is vested by our constitution in the legislature and may
not be delegated. When, however, the legislature has laid
down these fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to admin-
istrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative
power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legis-
lative purpose." 102
100 Cf. Milwaukee v. Rissling (1924) 184 Wis. 517, 199 N. W. 61: The
Court upheld an ordinance requiring electricians to be licensed and allowing
the examining board to determine the fitness of the applicant, saying: "The
duty devolved on the commission is to ascertain what is reasonably necessary
to constitute what may be deemed proper qualifications for a license. In
determining such qualifications and conducting the examination the commis-
sion acts, not in a legislative capacity, but in an administrative capacity.
When it has found the necessary 'facts' and acted favorably or unfavorably,
the provisions of the ordinance become operative automatically."
10L For other statements of the doctrine see: Adams v. Beloit (1900) 105
Wis. 363, 81 N. W. 869; Minn., St. P. and Ste. M. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm.
(1908) 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905; In re Griner 16 Wis. 423; Lathrop v.
Stedman (1875) 13 Blatch 134, Fed. Cas. No. 8519; State v. N. Haven and
Northhampton Co. (1876) 43 Conn. 351; Haeussler Inv. Co. v. Bates (1924)
306 Mo. 392, 267 S. W. 632; Locke's Appeal (1872) 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep.
716.
102 State ex rel. v. Whitman, supra, n. 92.
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"There is a distinction, however, between delegating power
to make a law and conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution. If a legislative act is clothed with all the forms
of law, and is complete in itself in form and substance, if
the officer, board, or commission to whom the authority is
alleged to have been delegated is given no power to add to or
take away from the law as enacted, if nothing is left to the
discretion as to what shall constitute the form and substance
of the statute, and if the statute embodies a full and complete
expression of the legislative will, matters relating to the ad-
ministration and execution of the statute do not constitute
an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority." 103
"The legislative power, while concerning itself with new
rules for the future, has as its true and proper subject-
matter the broad policy which it declares. All details in the
application of the policy may be delegated, though these de-
tails may involve the exercise of discretion and a choice be-
tween policies subordinate to the broad policy of the legis-
lature. Therefore, if Art. 1, sec. 1 (of the Constitution)
stood alone as an expression of the duty of Congress, that
body need only indicate the policy to be pursued, and it will
have exercised the power conferred upon it."104 Congress
may go further and lay down rules in detail, but in doing go
it is performing an administrative function and should do so
only so long as it can act efficiently.
"We think the correct rule as deduced from the better
authorities is that if an act but authorizes the administrative
officer or board to carry out the definitely expressed will of.
the legislature, although procedural directions and things
to be done are specified only in general terms, it is not vulner-
able to the criticism that it carries a delegation of legislative
power." 10
"The power to carry out a legislative policy enacted into
law under the police power may be delegated to an adminis-
trative board under quite general language, so long as the
exact policy is clearly made apparent." 1 0 6
103 State ex rel. v. Moorer (1929) 152 S. C. 455, 150 S. E. 269.
104 Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 Yale L. 3.
892.
305 Barbour v. State Board of Educ. (1932) 92 Mont. 321, 13 Pac. (2d) 225.
106 Redmond and Co. v. Mich. Securities Comm. (1923) 222 Mich. 1, 192
N. W. 688. For examples of statutes failing to state a policy, see: Chicago
v. Matthies (1926) 320 II1. 352, 151 N. E. 248; City of Eureka v. Wilson(1897) 15 Utah 67, 48 Pac. 150; Town of State Center v. Barnstein (1885)
66 Ia. 249, 23 N. W. 652; Ploner v. Standard Oil Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1922) 284 F.
34; Comm. v. Maletsky (1909) 203 Mass. 241, 89 N. E. 245; Harrigan-Reid
Co. v. Burton (1923) 224 Mich. 564, 195 N. W. 60; Samuels v. Couzens (1923)
222 Mich. 604, 193 N. W. 212; and ordinance of Detroit made it unlawful to
conduct a jewelry business without a license from the mayor. The Court
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Putting the proposition i4 another way, if the statute declares
a definite policy, it has expressed a sufficiently definite standard
for the guidance of the agency charged with its administration,
as far as the question of delegation of power goes.10 7 If this
postulate is accepted it is obvious that for the purposes of this
doctrine it makes not the slightest difference whether the ordi-
nance or statute regulates an ordinary lawful business or a mere
privilege, or whether it is an exercise of the police power and
necessary to accomplish the desired result. The same principle
must apply in either case.
Two things should be emphasized: (a) whether a statute is
void as a delegation of power is subject to the final determination
of the political jurisdiction sanctioning it. A state decision upon
the validity of a state statute is final, and the state is under no
compulsion to follow the lead of the federal courts. That is be-
cause the federal Constitution does not prevent a state legislature
from delegating its powers. Any prohibition must be found in
the state Constitution, and the decisions of the state courts on
that question are final. (b) Thus it is entirely possible for a
state to adopt any rule it wishes as to the meaning of this doctrine.
Though the foregoing analysis of the present status of the
doctrine is generally accepted by the several states, should a state
court ever wish to retrench, it could easily do so by changing its
view on this subject. But as the matter now stands, the doctrine
of non-delegation of legislative power offers little difficulty in
considering the problem of administrative discretion. And in
the words of Elihu Root, "There will be no withdrawal from these
experiments. We shall go on."' 08
held the ordinance void as a delegation of legislative power, saying: "... an
ordinance should at least express an idea upon the subject of regulation.
This ordinance . . . defines no policy or purpose, does not speak in regula-
tory terms, conveys no idea of an end desired, avows no object to be accom-
plished by way of means prescribed . . . and so offends against the elemen-
tary principles governing delegated functions."
107 For cases applying this principle, see: Butterfield v. Stranahan (1904)
192 U. S. 470; N. Y. Central Securities Corp. v. U. S. (1932) 287 U. S. 12;
Atcheson, T. and S. F. R. Co. (1911) 234 U. S. 476; State ex rel. v. Duval
County (1918) 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692; State v. Montgomery (1912) 177 Ala.
212, 59 So. 294; Grace Missionary Church v. City of Zion (1921) 300 Ill. 513,
133 N. E. 268; Spencer-Sturla Co. v. Memphis (Tenn. 1927) 290 S. W. 608;
Ece parte Weisberg (Calif. 1932) 12 Pac. (2d) 446; State v. Yopp, supra,
n. 85; Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra, n. 85.




Unguided Administrative Discretion and Due Process of Law or
Equal Protection of Law
The next question to consider is the validity of apparently un-
guided administrative discretion when tested in the light of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. There are two clauses of the Amendments that are in-
volved: the equal protection of the law clause and the due process
of law clause. It is the purpose of the following discussion to
demonstrate that the mere grant of an apparently unqualified
discretion does not of itself violate either of these two constitu-
tional safeguards. The mere conference of apparently unguided
power deprives no one of the equal protection of the law or of
property or liberty without due process of law. It is only when
the discretion conferred is exercised in an arbitrary manner that
the rights of the individual are impaired.
It should be repeated here, that those cases which deal with the
conference of discretion in the regulation of a matter of mere
privilege present no problem under the Fourteenth Amendment
because there are no "rights" involved.
One other class of cases should be disposed of rather summarily
when considering the question of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that is the class of case in which the court has before it a munici-
pal ordinance and declares it void because it is unreasonable.
There are several cases in which courts have declared an ordi-
nance unreasonable because it conferred an apparently unguided
discretion when there was no reason why standards could not
have been expressed. 0 9 Thus, in Cicero Lumber Company v.
Town of Cicero,"0 the court said: "The ordinance, in so far as it
vests the board of trustees with the discretion indicated, is un-
reasonable. It prohibits what is in itself and as a general thing
lawful, and leaves the [matter] . . . to an unregulated official
discretion when the whole thing should be regulated by perma-
109 Chicago v. Trotter (1891) 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359; Frazee's Case
(1886) 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72; Anderson v. City of Wellington (1888),
supra, n. 39; State ex rel. v. Town of Ripley (1924), supra, n. 60.
110 (1898) 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 696: The ordinance pro-
hibited the operation of traffic vehicles (as distinguished from pleasure ve-
hicles) upon a designated street without "special permission."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
nent and local provisions operating generally and impartially."
This passage was quoted and followed in Mayor v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company."'
The theory upon which the courts declare an ordinance void for
unreasonableness has nothing to do with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The theory is simply that the municipal legislature had
no "authority" to pass an unreasonable ordinance. A municipal
legislature exercises a delegated legislative power, and "in every
power given to a municipal corporation to pass by-laws or ordi-
nances there is an implied restriction that the by-laws or ordi-
nances will be reasonable."' 112 Or, as stated by the court in
Mayor of Baltimore v. Radecke,113 "We are of the opinion that
there may be an ordinance . . . so clearly unreasonable, so
arbitrary, oppressive, or partial as to raise the presumption that
the legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and
to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain
abuse of authority."
However, this rule applies only to ordinances enacted under a
general grant or under implied and incidental powers. It does
not apply to an ordinance which the legislature has given the
municipal corporation express power to pass.
"If passed by virtue of an express power, an ordinance can-
not be set aside by a court for mere unreasonableness, since
questions as to the wisdom and expediency of a regulation
rest alone with the state law-making power," (subject to the
restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment).114
"Where the power to enact the particular ordinance is
specifically conferred on the municipality, the question
whether it is reasonable can no more be raised so as to affect
its validity than could the same objection be raised against
the statute so as to affect its validity." 115
"If an ordinance is passed in virtue of and in exact con-
formity with an express grant of legislative power . . . a
court will not pass upon the validity of such an ordinance.
The attack, if any, must be made against the constitutionality
of the enabling statute." 116
'1 (1908) 107 Md. 178, 68 Atl. 490: The ordinance made it unlawful to
keep domestic animals in certain places without a permit from the mayor.
112 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) sec. 761.
113 (1878) 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239.
114 McQuillin, op. cit., n. 112 at sec. 760.
i1i Shea v. Muncie (1897) 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138.
116 Fritz v. Presbrey (1922) 44 R. I. 207, 116 Atl. 419.
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Though the question of the power of a court to declare an ordi-
nance void because unreasonable is an important one when con-
sidering the problem of administrative discretion, it is not pro-
posed to discuss it in detail here. It is only necessary to note
that the question can always be eliminated, if the legislature
wishes to extend the practice of conferring apparently unguided
discretion, by providing express statutory authority for the muni-
cipal ordinance. Otherwise the doctrine announced will apply.
But even so, whether the court will declare an ordinance which
fails to specify guides for the discretion conferred unreasonable
will depend upon the circumstances. As conditions change so
will the opinions of the judges; the ordinance which was declared
unreasonable in Mayor of Baltimore v. Radeeke in 1878 might not
be declared unreasonable by the same court today. One can only
speculate upon the matter.
When considering the validity of apparently unguided admin.
istrative discretion in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment it
is necessary to know how the ordinance or statute conferring the
discretion has been construed-i. e. whether the ordinance or
statute, as finally construed, does in fact confer an unregulated
discretion, or confers a guided discretion, guided by the implied
standard of reasonableness, to be determined by the subject mat-
ter regulated and the policy of the statute in regulating it.
The construction of an ordinance or statute is a matter for the
political jurisdiction which sanctions it. The meaning of any
state statute is subject to the final determination of the courts of
that state. So in considering the problem it will be necessary to
assume first one construction and then the other.
VALIDITY OF APPARENTLY UNGUIDED DISCRETION WHICH HAS BEEN
CONSTRUED TO BE ARBITRARY DISCRETION
Though a statute conferring a discretionary power which has
been construed to be arbitrary would undoubtedly be void as a
delegation of legislative power, 117 the courts have not always
placed their decisions upon that ground. For this reason it is
believed that an analysis of the problem from this standpoint is
not purely an academic one. When considering this problem
the courts rarely distinguish between the equal protection of the
IT Supra, c. III.
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law clause and the due process of law clause. It is the belief of
the writer that the distinction is not necessary, because, for the
purpose of this discussion, one includes the other.
There is a long list of state decisions which have construed
ordinances failing to lay down express standards for the guidance
of the discretionary powers conferred as an attempt to confer
arbitrary power. The ordinances so construed were then de-
clared void. Those cases were considered and cited when dis-
cussing the ordinary lawful business rule, supra, and will be con-
sidered again only for the purpose of scrutinizing their reasoning.
Needless to say, the courts did not always make their reasons
clear. It is not necessary to review the cases in detail. It is
sufficient to indicate that most of them said or implied that a
statute or ordinance which conferred arbitrary power ipso facto
deprived the affected persons of the equal protection of the law.
In no case was such a statement explained. Is it sound?
The question becomes this: Does the mere existence of an
arbitrary power over a person's property deprive him of the
equal protection of the law, or is it only the arbitrary exercise of
that power which deprives him of the equal protection of the law?
It is impossible to answer the question with certainty, in view of
the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not spoken
definitely.
The mere grant of an arbitrary discretionary power over the
property of an individual does not ipso facto deprive him of the
equal protection of the law. That discretion may never be exer-
cised arbitrarily and unless it is arbitrarily exercised the indi-
vidual is deprived of nothing. The law is applied to him just as
it is to everyone else. He is protected "equally" with everyone
else. To illustrate: suppose a statute prohibits the engagement
in a particular business of anyone without a license and vests an
arbitrary discretionary power in the licensing officer. If an indi-
vidual applies for a license and gets it, has the law failed to pro-
tect him "equally"? Has he been denied the equal protection of
the law? The mere requirement that he secure a license does
not deny him equal protection, for everyone else is also required
to secure one. The fact that some discretion is vested in the
licensing officer is unobjectionable for it is now clearly settled
that a guided discretion is valid. What difference does it make
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whether that discretion is guided or unguided? If a guided dis-
cretion is exercised arbitrarily the courts will give relief," s at
least to whatever extent is procedurally possible, which is the
problem discussed in the next chapter. The court gives the same
relief when an arbitrary discretion is arbitrarily exercised. 119 A
statute which authorizes an agent to deny an individual equal
protection does not ipso facto deny him equal protection of the
law, but has that effect only when the agent discriminates against
the individual.
A dictum in Gundling v. Chicago 120 supports such a thesis. The
court said: "It seems somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff in
error is in a position to raise the question of the invalidity of the
ordinance because of the alleged arbitrary power of the mayor
to grant or refuse it [a license]. He has made no application for
a license, and of course the mayor has not refused it. Non
constat, that he would have refused it if application had been
made by the plaintiff in error. Whether the discretion is arbi-
trary or not would seem to be unimportant to the plaintiff in er-
ror so long as he has made no application for the exercise of the
discretion in his favor and was not refused a license." If that is
so, the mere existence of an arbitrary power in the mayor is no
concern of the plaintiff. It is not until that power is arbitrarily
exercised against him that he is injured.
A statement by the United States Supreme Court in Plymouth
Coal Company v. Pennsylvania'2' also supports such a thesis.
The court said: "We may once more repeat, what has so often
been said, that one who would strike down a state statute as
violative of the Federal Constitution . . . must show that the
alleged unconstitutional feature operates122 so as to deprive him
of rights protected by the Federal Constitution." The wording of
the statement has significance. It is: if the statute "operates"
so as to deprive him of rights, etc. It is the operation of the
statute that controls. The statute can not operate to deprive him
of rights until it is arbitrarily enforced against him.
There is an obvious answer to such reasoning: The statute
18 Peo. ex rel. Lieberman v. Van DeCarr (1905), supra, n. 69.
119 Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), supra, n. 22.
1- (1889) 177 U. S. 183.
121 (1914) 232 U. S. 531.
122 Italics those of the present writer.
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conferring arbitrary power ipso facto denies each individual the
equal protection of the law because the statute does not insure
him equal protection. If he gets equal protection it is by virtue
of the will of the discretionary agent and not by virtue of any pro-
vision of the statute, which gives him no right to equal protection
with others. Each individual is entitled as a matter of right to
the equal protection of the law. Unless the statute itself gives
him that right he does not have it. But law itself must insure him
equal protection.
This theory is supported by a much-quoted statement of the
court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins :123 "The very idea that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any ma-
terial right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
But there is a rejoinder to this answer. If the individual in
fact receives equal protection he can not complain. The state
has not denied him equal protection. And the statement quoted
from Yick Wo v. Hopkins assumes that the exercise of an arbi-
trary "will" is beyond control. That assumption is not correct,
for once the "will" is exercised so as to discriminate against that
person he is deprived of equal protection of law and may obtain
relief in the federal courts.
What is the essence of the argument? Merely this. A dis-
cretion which has been construed to be arbitrary is unobjection-
able in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it is
not exercised arbitrarily. Is the discretion really arbitrary then?
If the courts will control an unreasonable exercise of the discre-
tion does the administrative agency actually have any more than
a "reasonable" discretion? And that leads to a consideration of
the next subject:
VALIDITY OF APPARENTLY UNGUIDED DISCRETION WHICH HAS BEEN
CONSTRUED TO BE GUIDED BY THE IMPLIED STANDARD OF
REASONABLENESS
In accord with the steady expansion of the administrative sys-
tem there has been an increasing tendency on the part of the
courts to read into every statute the implied guide of reasonable-
123 Supra, n. 22.
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ness--i. e., they have refused to construe the statute as an attempt
to confer arbitrary power.124 Once such a construction has been
placed upon a statute is there any question of its validity under
the Fourteenth Amendment? Does its validity depend upon
whether that degree of discretion is "necessary"? The recent cases
are quite clear; the answer appears to be an unequivocal "no."
The theory upon which the courts go is that the administrative
agency is given only a reasonable discretion. It can not be pre-
sumed that the discretion will be exercised arbitrarily, and if
ever it should be, the person discriminated against would have a
remedy in the courts. It is not until the discretion has been
abused that any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are in-
volved.
The objection is often made that the power given might be
abused, since there are no express guides. As it has been as-
sumed that the statute was not intended to authorize such an
abuse it must follow that the objection is nothing more than that
the officer might exceed his authority. Such an objection has been
emphatically answered. The court in Ex Parte Holmes,125 when
considering an ordinance which gave to certain officers an ap-
parently unqualified discretion to grant or refuse permits to
dealers in secondhand goods, said: "Laws are not made upon the
theory of the total depravity of those who are elected to administer
them; and the presumption is that the municipal officers will not
use their small powers villainously or for purposes of oppression
or mischief." And Justice Holmes, speaking for the court in
Union Telegraph Company v. City of Richmond,12 6 said: "The
objection that other motives may come in is merely that which
may be made to all authority-that it may be dishonest-an ob-
jection that would make government impossible if it prevailed."
Moreover, if one assumes the dishonesty of the administrator, ex-
press guides would do no good. And Justice McKenna expressed
the same idea when he wrote the decision of the court in Lehman
v. State Board of Accountancy:127 "We cannot . . . assume
that the board will be impelled to action by other than a sense of
duty or render judgment except upon convincing evidence.
124 Supra, 274 et seq. See cases cited in n. 53.
125 (1921) 187 Calif. 640, 203 Pac. 398.
126 (1911) 224 U. S. 160.
127 (1923) 263 U. S. 394.
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We certainly cannot restrain the board upon the possibility of
[arbitrary] action. Official bodies would be of no use as instru-
ments of government, if they could be prevented from action by
the supposition of wrongful action." It will be time enough to
complain, when, if ever, the power shall be thus abused." 128
In Smith v. Cahoon,1 29 the court expressly passed on the point.
The plaintiff had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle on
the highways of Florida without a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity as required by a statute. Before consid-
ering the power of the state to pass the statute in question the
court made this sweeping statement: "The appellant did not ap-
ply for a certificate, and the principle is well established that when
a statute, valid upon its- face, requires the issue of a license or
certificate as a condition precedent to carrying on a business of
following a vocation, one who is within the terms of the statute,
but has failed to make the required application, is not at liberty
to complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid
action in administration."
At the next term of court this principle was affirmed by the
court in Continental Baking Co. ,v. Woodring.1 30 The statute in-
volved was the Kansas Motor Vehicle Act which gave the Public
Service Commission power to insist that motor vehicles be main-
tained "in a safe and sanitary condition," to prescribe qualifica-
tions of operators as to age and hours of service, and to require the
reporting of accidents. In upholding this provision the court,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, said: "Appellants had
no right to resort to equity merely because of an anticipation of
improper or invalid action in administration." And when speak-
128 Gorieb v. Fox (1927) 274 U. S. 603.
"If the enforcement of the law gives rise to situations impairing consti-
tutional rights, they may be considered as they arise." Wis. Telephone Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm. (1932) 206 Wis. 589, 240 N. W. 411.
"Learned counsel for defendant suggests some extreme cases, showing how
reckless and arbitrary might be the action of executive officers proceeding
under an Act of Congress, the enforcement of which affects the enjoyment
or value of private property. It will be time enough to deal with such cases
as and when they arise." Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States (1909),
supra, n. 47.
12) (1931) 283 U. S. 553.
130 (1932) 286 U. S. 352, 81 A. L. R. 1402. See also Dalton v. Adding Mla-
chine Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 699; Lehon v. Atlanta (1916) 242 U. S. 53; Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 539; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp.




ing of similar provisions the court said: "the objection [that the
commission might act arbitrarily] . raises no question
which can now be considered, as there has been no action or threat
of action, so far as appears, by the commission, giving ground
for the contention that the constitutional rights of the appellants
have been or will be invaded."
A Federal District Court recently had this question squarely
before it.131 A "Texas Livestock Tick Eradication" act provided
for the compulsory systematic dipping of cattle infested with
ticks. Before there was any effort to enforce the act the plaintiff
sought to restrain its enforcement on the ground that the act
contained at least three provisions conferring upon an adminis-
trative commission arbitrary and unrestrained power. The court
refused to issue the injunction, saying: "If the plaintiff can be
compelled to a course of systematic dipping, and the act in its
general features and purposes is valid, but only some subordinate
feature of it is in question, plaintiff can not now obtain an injunc-
tion against those features, even if generally invalid, but must
wait and apply for relief against such provision when it is first
sought to be applied against him. . . . There is neither allega-
tion nor proof that the plaintiff has been discriminated against in
favor of other persons, or that the plaintiff has been, or is about
to be, proceeded against by injunction . . . or that any of the
things complained of as illegally provided by the act have been
or will be done in any way to effect injury to the plaintiff, and it is
but an academic speculation to consider what ought to be done to
relieve plaintiff against a case which has not yet arisen and which
may never arise. . . . It will be time enough for the court to
determine whether his situation is such as to entitle him to relief
when he feels the pressure of the particular provisions of which
he complains."
The courts did not ignore the possibility of the arbitrary exer-
cise of the discretion conferred. Though they would not presume
such action in advance for the purpose of declaring a statute in-
valid, they clearly indicated that if the case of abuse should arise
the aggrieved person would have his remedy in the courts.
In People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van DeCarr,132 the court in up-
i1 Armstrong v. Whitten (D. C. S. D. Tex. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 241.
132 (1905), supra, n. 69.
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holding an ordinance of New York prohibiting the sale of milk
without a written permit from the board of health, said: "There
is no presumption that the power will be exercised arbitrarily, and
when it is shown to be thus exercised against the individual,
under sanction of state authority, this court has not hesitated
to interfere for his protection, when the case has come before it
in such manner as to authorize the interference of a Federal Court
[citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins] ."
In Plymouth Coal Company v. Pennsylvania,183 the court said:
"It is to be presumed, until the contrary appears, that the admin-
istrative body would have acted with reasonable regard to the
property rights of the plaintiff in error; and certainly if there
had been any arbitrary exercise of its powers, its determination
would have been subject to judicial review. . . . Were this not
expressed in the act, it would none the less be implied, at least so
far as pertains to any violation of rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment [citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, and People ex rel.
v. Van DeCarr] ."
In Merrick v. Halsey and Company,134 the court, after indicat-
ing that the presumption is that the power conferred would not
be abused, added: "If there should be such a disregard of duty, a
remedy in the courts is expressly given, and if it were not given it
would necessarily be implied."
In Ex Parte Weisberg, 35 appears this statement: "We cannot
say that the present act confers unreasonable and arbitrary pow-
ers upon a subordinate officer or agent. The various duties and
powers bestowed upon the fire marshall by the act may not be
arbitrarily discharged, but must be discharged in the exercise of
a reasonable discretion with a view to effectuating the purpose of
the act. An abuse of these duties and powers may readily be
remedied by a resort to the courts."
In Sumner v. Ward, 36 the court said: "The fact of fitness is
submitted to the judgment of the officer, and it calls for the exer-
cise of a discretion of a judicial nature, and the action of the offi-
cer may be reviewed in the courts for an arbitrary exercise."
133 (1914) 232 U. S. 531.
14 (1917) 242 U. S. 568.
135 (Calif. 1932) 12 Pac. (2d) 446.
136 (1923) 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502.
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In Cutsinger v. Atlanta,13 7 the court, after presuming that the
discretion conferred would not be arbitrarily exercised, said: "if
the power is sought to be arbitrarily and wrongfully exercised,
the courts will apply a remedy."
Thus it is quite clear that whenever an administrative authority
exercises its powers in such a way that constitutional rights of
the individual are impaired, the courts will provide a remedy. Just
what the courts will consider in their review and the procedure
by which a review is possible will be considered in the next
chapter.
There is still one important question to be considered. As was
noted above, the rule as ordinarily stated sanctions a failure to
specify definite standards if "necessary," and many of the cases
do find, as a matter of fact, that it was necessary because a more
definite standard was impracticable under the circumstances.
The difficulties presented in interpreting the meaning of the word
"necessary" have already been indicated, but aside from that, is
there anything in the Fourteenth Amendment which requires a
standard to be as definite as possible? It is believed that there
is not.
The appropriateness of a police power regulation under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been a
troublesome question. Appropriateness must depend upon the
circumstances, and circumstances are constantly changing. There
are really two parts to this question: (a) appropriateness of
any regulation of the particular subject matter involved and, (b)
appropriateness of a particular kind of regulation. The test as
exemplified by the cases is whether, in view of the prevailing pub-
lic opinion at the time, and in view of all the circumstances, the
legislature could be reasonably justified in believing two things;
(a) that regulation of the subject matter bears a direct relation
to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, and (b)
that the particular kind of regulation attempted has a reasonable
tendency to secure the end desired. In neither case is appropri-
ateness made to depend upon "necessity." The following cases
will illustrate the point:
In Nobel State Bank v. HaskeUl,138 the court upheld an Olda-
I87 (1914) 142 Ga. 555, 83 S. E. 263.
iaa (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487.
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homa bank deposit guarantee statute on the theory that the legis-
lature was reasonably justified in believing that (a) a regulation
of the banking system bore a direct relation to the public welfare,
in that the whole commercial system depended on it, and (b) the
statute in question had a reasonable tendency to secure a sound
banking system. The statute was not held to be necessary to se-
cure a sound banking system. In fact, Justice Holmes person-
ally doubted its tendency to do so.
In Block v. Hirs,139 the court upheld a statute of Congress al-
lowing tenants of property in Washington, D. C., to continue in
possession thereof notwithstanding the expiration of their leases,
subject to regulations of a commission created by the act. The
theory of the court was that Congress was reasonably justified
in believing, in view of the emergencies growing out of the war,
(a) that a regulation of the subject matter bore a direct relation-
ship to the public welfare, and (b) that the particular regulation
had a reasonable tendency to accomplish the desired result. The
court did not say that the regulation was necessary for that pur-
pose. In fact it negatived such an opinion when it said: "as-
suming that the end in view justified the means adopted by Con-
gress, we have no concern of course with the question of whether
those means were the wisest." If the means had been necessary
there would have been no question of whether they were the
"wisest."
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,40 the court
upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance which restricted the
plaintiff's land to a residential use on the theory that the legis-
lature was reasonably justified in believing (a) that a zoning ordi-
nance bore a direct relationship to the public welfare, and (b)
that the exclusion of business from a residential district tended
to promote the general welfare by protecting children, sup-
pressing disorder, etc. But the court did not say that such ex-
clusion was necessary.
In Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-operative Marketing Association,141 the court upheld a Ken-
tucky statute which allowed the incorporation of growers' co-
139 (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 16 A. L. R. 165.
140 (1926) 272 U. S. 365, 54 A. L. R. 1016.
142 (1928) 276 U. S. 71.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/1
UNGUIDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
operative marketing associations and made any one who know-
ingly persuaded a member to break his contract subject to a statu-
tory penalty, on the theory that the legislature was reasonably
justified in believing, under the circumstances, (a) that co-
operative marketing agreements were to the interest of the public
and should be protected, and (b) that the penalty imposed had
a reasonable tendency to protect them. The court did not say
that the penalty was necessary. It is entirely possible that some
other sanction would have accomplished the result.
Though these cases do not involve the problem of discretion, it
is believed that they amply support the writer's contention, which
is that when the legislature exercises its police power, the means
used do not have to be necessary. It is sufficient if they have a
reasonable tendency to secure the end desired (provided that end
is a proper one). Applying such a principle to licensing cases
involving an apparently unregulated discretion, one gets this re-
sult: One starts with the proposition that the legislature is rea-
sonably justified in believing that regulation of the subject mat-
ter by means of a license bears a direct relationship to the public
welfare. The only question then is the validity of the means
used. The means of regulation used is an administrative agency
with discretionary powers guided only by the implied rule of
reasonableness. The use of an apparently unguided administra-
tive agency does not have to be necessary. It is sufficient if the
use of such an agency has a reasonable tendency to accomplish the
regulation desired.
CHAPTER V
Unguided Administrative Discretion and Judicial Review
It is next proposed to consider whether or not the conference
of apparently unguided administrative discretion is sound legis-
lative practice. The problem will be considered primarily from
the standpoint of the persons affected. From that approach, the
major problem is one of control-the question of safeguards to
prevent an arbitrary exercise of the power conferred. By analogy
to the theory of preventive medicine, the best safeguard is the
one that operates before the evil occurs, i. e. a safeguard that
tends to prevent any attempt to exercise a discretionary power
arbitrarily. There are two possible "preventive remedies": (a)
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the abolition of unguided discretionary power, and (b) the mini-
mizing of the danger of an arbitrary exercise of unguided dis-
cretionary power by a careful selection of administrative per-
sonnel. In view of the causes of the rapid development and pres-
ent magnitude of the administrative system it is not probable
that the first remedy will be adopted. The soundness of the the-
ory of the second reinedy is not questioned. The only difficulty is
a practical one: how is a careful selection of a capable adminis-
trative personnel to be secured? The problem of improving the
personnel of governmental agencies is as old as government it-
self, and the prospects for its immediate total solution are not
very great. Therefore, the persons affected by the conference of
unguided administrative discretion must rely on some other safe-
guard, at least for the present.
The courts historically have been the tribunals relied upon to
protect the rights of individuals, and it is to them that persons
instinctively turn to secure relief from arbitrary action. In order
to complete the picture of administrative discretion, it is neces-
sary to consider the extent to which arbitrary action may be con-
trolled by judicial review.
The discretionary powers of administrative officers fall into
two broad classes: the power to regulate matters of right, and the
power to regulate matters of privilege. An abuse of power
which falls into the latter class presents no legal problem, for in
order to obtain relief from an abuse of discretion it is necessary
for the complainant to show an invasion of his "rights." If he
has no right involved, and has only a privilege, he has no basis of
complaint. The point is illustrated by a case decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1891.142 A New York statute pro-
hibited anyone from engaging in the business of an auctioneer
without a license, and made the issuance of the license discretion-
ary with the mayor of the city. The plaintiff was refused a li-
cense and he began mandamus proceedings to compel the issuance
of a license to him, on the theory that the mayor's refusal was
arbitrary. The court refused to interfere, saying: "To obtain
relief by mandamus it is necessary that a relator show an invasion
of a clear legal right. This he has not done," for there is no
: 2 People ex rel. v. Grant (1891) 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 964.
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"right" to engage in the business of an auctioneer; it is a mere
"privilege." Such a doctrine clearly places this type of discretion
beyond judicial control. 143 But in regard to the discretionary
power to regulate matters of right, an abuse of discretion is sub-
ject to judicial control if the abuse results in an invasion of private
rights.144
When a court reviews the action of an administrative body for
the purpose of determining whether or not its action was reason-
able, it does not substitute its own opinion for that of the admin-
istrative body. It merely determines whether or not there are
any facts which could reasonably justify the action.145 If there
are, the court will not interfere, even though its own discretion
exercised under identical circumstances might have led to an en-
tirely different action. As it has been said,14 6 the court "must
not forget that the discretion to be exercised is that of the" ad-
ministrative body, and the court can not substitute its own dis-
cretion for that of the administrative body "to whom the Legis-
lature has specifically confided its exercise. If it were otherwise,
the city would be governed by the courts, and not by the city offi-
cers in whom the law vests the governmental power."
The question of whether the court will review by means of a
trial de novo, or will confine its consideration to the record of the
administrative proceeding is an important one in some types of
cases, but not in the type of proceeding ordinarily involved here.
The reason is that in the great majority of cases where a discre-
tionary power guided only by the rule of reasonableness is con-
ferred, there is no formal record of the administrative proceed-
ing. The only possible method of review in such cases is by
143 See cases cited supra, notes 60, 61 and 62.
Though the privilege doctrine is quite clear, it is most difficult to apply.
Just what is a privilege? What is the distinction between a privilege and a
right? The courts themselves are not agreed. The operation of a theatre
has been called both a right (Vincent v. Seattle, supra, n. 66) and a privi-
lege (Oakley v. Richards, supra, n. 63). The same is true of the opera-
tion of filling stations (cases cited supra, n. 75 and n. 77), and of the
use of the streets (cases cited supra, notes 82 and 83). The distinction is
difficult to draw, and often depends upon history (see cases holding the sale
of liquor to be a privilege). In view of the confusion on the subject, too much
reliance should not be placed on the doctrine.
144 See cases cited supra in notes 132-137, inc.
1,r In re Hunstiger (1915) 130 Minn. 474, 153 N. W. 869.
148 Bainbridge v. Minneapolis (1915) 131 Minn. 195, 154 N. W. 964, L. R. A.
1916 C. 224.
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means of a trial de novo. Consequently, this problem is not an
important one under present circumstances. 147
But the problem of the procedure by means of which the courts
may review an arbitrary administrative decision has caused the
courts much difficulty. There are six methods by means of which
the matter may be placed before the court: (a) mandamus pro-
ceedings, (b) injunction suit, (c) certioragi, (d) habeas corpus,
(e) defense to a prosecution for disregarding the administrative
decision, and (f) damage suit against the administrative officer.
The availability of each of these remedies should be considered.
MANDAMUS
The writ of mandamus is an ancient common-law writ which
issued from a common-law court of competent jurisdiction, com-
manding an officer to perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
148
But during the long development of the writ certain dogmas have
grown up. "It is commonly said that by mandamus courts will
enforce only such official duties as are ministerial" 149 as distin-
guished from those duties which are discretionary.1 5 0 It was the
original function of the writ to compel the performance of non-
discretionary duties,1 51 but when, under modern conditions, offi-
cers were given greater and greater discretionary powers, an ex-
ception was added to the rule. The courts began to state the
147 The question of what should be the basis of the court's review was the
main issue in Crowell v. Benson (1931) 285 U. S. 22. The court was called
upon to review an administrative award made under the Federal Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Act. One of the questions involved was the fact
question of whether the injured man was in the employment of the defendant.
The district court refused to consider the record of the Employees' Compen-
sation Commission, and allowed a hearing de novo. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the action of the district court, announcing what Professor Dickinson
calls the doctrine of "constitutional fact." Such a doctrine is a logical ex-
tension of the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact": those facts upon which de-
pend the statutory jurisdiction or the constitutional power of the commission
to act are subject to a judicial determination upon independent evidence. For
an excellent analysig and criticism of this case see Dickenson, Crowell v. Ben-
son-Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of Con-
stitutional Fact (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. R. 1055.
148 High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d Ed. 1884) sec. 1; Freund,
op. cit., supra, n. -1 at p. 255, 38 C. J. 541.
149 Freund, op. cit., supra, n. 1 at p. 255.
150 38 C. J. 592, and cases collected in note 55.
151 Comm'rs of Poor v. Lynah (1822) 2 McCord (S. C.) 170; "The power
of this court to control all inferior jurisdictions and subordinate magistrates,
and to compel them to the performanceof those duties imposed upon them by
law can not be doubted."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/1
UNGUIDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
rule and then to qualify it. It was said in Dunham v. Ardery:152
"The law as expressed by this court . . . will not permit the
use of the writ of mandamus to control an inferior officer in the
performance of duties requiring the exercise of discretion . .
except when it is alleged and shown that such officer acts arbi-
trarily or fraudulently; in such case the writ may issue." 153 And
in People ex rel. v. Baker,154 it was said: "The power to issue
licenses [to conduct a concert hall] . . . is discretionary, and
not controllable by mandamus. This rule is varied only when the
action of the board or person vested with the power of issuing a
license is arbitrary, or tyrannical, or unreasonable, or is based
upon false information." Another court stated the rule to be
that "when a discretion is given, the court will not interfere, un-
less it be clearly shown that this discretion has been abused."
This exception to the rule has been affirmatively applied. A
Missouri school board had a discretionary power to fix the time,
place, and manner of holding elections for the selection of mem-
bers of the school board. This board selected, for purely parti-
san ends, an election committee composed of members of one
political party. There was strong objection and mandamus
proceedings were brought to compel the board to rescind the ap-
pointments it had made and appoint a new committee composed
of members of different political parties.155 The theory of the
proceeding was that the board had grossly abused its discretion.
The court found that there had been an abuse of discretion and
granted the writ of mandamus, saying: "While it is generally
true that mandamus will not lie to control the discretion of an in-
ferior tribunal in whom a discretion is vested in the performance
or non-performance of certain duties devolved upon it by law, it
is well settled that if the discretionary power is exercised with
manifest injustice the courts are not precluded from command-
ing its due exercise. Such an abuse of discretion is controllable
152 (1914) 43 Okla. 619, 143 Pac. 331.
153 The court relies upon the following cases, and they all support the
statement: Board of County Comm'rs v. State ex rel. (1912) 31 Okla. 196,
120 Pac. 913; Norris v. Cross (1909) 25 Okla. 287,105 Pac. 1000; Montgomery
v. State Electric Board (1910) 27 Okla. 324, 111 Pac. 447; McKee v. Adair
Electric Board (1912) 36 Okla. 258, 128 Pac. 294; Roberts v. Marshall (1912)
33 Okla. 719, 127 Pac. 703.
154 (1909) 136 App. Div. 7, 12 N. W. S. 161.
15 State ex rel. v. Public School Board (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35 S. W. 617.
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by mandamus."1 56 The court concluded "that in the action taken
the school board so abused the discretion confided in it that it was
a virtual refusal to perform the duty of holding an impartial elec-
tion, 157 and that in contemplation of law it has refused to act at
all, and it is our [the court's] duty to disregard its unjust action
and require it by our [the court's] mandate to proceed in a law-
ful way."
It is important that the theory of the court be emphasized.
The school board abused its discretion. By doing so it refused
to act in a lawful way. The court therefore disregarded its
action and proceeded to compel it to exercise its discretion again,
and to exercise a "lawful" discretion. In theory the court did
not tell the board how to exercise its discretion, but merely said
that a particular exercise of discretion was unlawful and beyond
its power. The board was left free to pick the individual mem-
bers of the committee, so long as they were not all from the same
political party.
This theory has been accepted as a bona fide method of prevent-
ing an abuse of discretion in granting or refusing to grant li-
censes. An Illinois statute gave the State Board of Dental Ex-
aminers powers to determine which dental colleges were "reput-
able" for the purpose of granting licenses to their graduates
without requiring them to pass an examination. The case of
Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. Cooper'68 involved a
mandamus proceeding brought for the purpose of compelling the
board to issue a license to the relator without an examination, on
the ground that the board had abused its discretion in refusing
to recognize the relator's alma mater as "reputable." The court
said: "If a discretionary power is exercised with manifest in-
156 The court quotes and relies upon the following cases: Village of Glen-
coe v. People exr el. (1875) 78 Ill. 382: "The discretion vested in the coun-
cil cannot be exercised arbitrarily, for the gratification of feelings of malevo-
lence, or for the atainment of merely personal and selfish ends. It must be
exercised for the public good, and should be controlled by judgment and not
by passion or prejudice. When a discretion is abused, and made to work
injustice, it is admissible that it shall be controlled by mandamus."
State eo rel. v. State Board of Health (1890) 103 Mo. 22, 15 S. W. 322:
"If the board of health should exercise its powers with manifest injustice,
then the courts may, and will, control the abuse of authority by the writ of
mandamus."157 A duty imposed by the rule of reasonableness.
158 (1887) 123 fI1. 227, 13 N. E. 201.
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justice, the courts are not precluded from commanding its due
exercise. They will interfere, where it is clearly shown that the
discretion is abused. Such abuse of discretion will be controlled
by mandamus. A public officer or inferior tribunal may be
guilty of so gross an abuse of discretion, or such an evasion of
positive duty as to amount to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. In such
case mandamus will afford a remedy."
In Pavilion Ice Rink v. Bryant,1 59 it was alleged that the de-
fendant "arbitrarily and capriciously and unreasonably" refused
to renew the plaintiff's permit to conduct a dance pavilion. Upon
demurrer the court granted a writ of mandamus, saying: "From
the allegations of the petition, it appears that, without any legal
cause, but arbitrarily, oppressively and capriciously, the board
suddenly terminated plaintiff's right1 60 to conduct a lawful and
profitable business upon premises which were leased for that
purpose upon the faith of the permit theretofore granted...
It is not necessary to cite authority to the point that a lawful busi-
ness, properly conducted . . . can not be confiscated by the
arbitrary and capricious dictation of any official body."
In People ex rel. v. State Racing Commission,'61 the court found
that the commission had arbitrarily and capriciously refused to
issue the relator a license to operate a race track, and granted a
writ of mandamus ordering the issuance of a license. "While the
rule is that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a
power the exercise of which lies in the discretion of the officer
against whom the writ is sought, to that rule there is a well known
exception that the action of the officer must not be capricious or
arbitrary, and, if such be the character of the reasons for refus-
ing to act, the writ will lie."
When an administrative officer with discretionary power acts
arbitrarily and abuses his discretion there is no bona fide exercise
of discretion. There is nothing but a wilful violation of his duty,
and it is the proper function of the writ of mandamus to compel
him to perform his duty. Upon this theory mandamus issued
159 (Calif. App. 1922) 209 Pac. 76.
160 The court does not consider the point whether the business of conducting
a dance pavilion is a "right" or mere "privilege."
161 (1907) 190 N. Y. 31, 82 N. E. 723.
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to compel the granting of a license to exercise the vocation of
booking emigrant passengers, when the license was arbitrarily
refused, 162 and to compel a medical college to give the relator an
examination and confer a degree upon him if he passed, when the
right was claimed arbitrarily to refuse, 10 3 and to compel the
granting of permission to change the location of an employment
agency when the permission was arbitrarily refused. 164 And,
mandamus would have issued to compel a department of health
to rescind its action revoking a permit to sell milk if the revoca-
tion had been unreasonable,16 ; or to compel the reinstatement of
a public school teacher if dismissal had been without reasonable
cause, 166 or to compel the issuance of a license to practice dentistry
if the refusal had been arbitrary,6 7 or to compel a civil service
commission to reclassify an office as competitive or non-com-
petitive if the classification had been unreasonable. 0 8
However, such a conception of the remedy of mandamus is not
always accepted. Some courts say that the writ of mandamus
lies to compel a discretionary body to act, but it can go no fur-
ther. If the administrative body has acted and exercised its dis-
cretion mandamus will not lie. Thus in Ewbank v. Turner,0 0
the court refused to issue the writ to compel a board of dental
examiners to issue the relator a license to practice dentistry even
though the refusal were "wrongful, unlawful, unjust, arbitrary,
and without cause or reason." The theory of the court was that
the statute required the applicant for a license to be found com-
petent by the board, and unless he were in fact found to be compe-
tent by the board no license could issue. Whether or not the
board acted arbitrarily made no difference so far as this par-
ticular remedy was concerned. It is what they actually decided
that determined the applicant's right to a license. If the court
162 Peo. ex rel. v. Perry (1852) 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 206.
163 Peo. ex Tel. v. Belleville Hospital Medical College (1891) 60 Hun. (N. Y.)
107, 14 N. Y. S. 490.
14 Peo. ex rel. v. Robinson (1910) 141 App. Div. 656, 126 N. Y. S. 546.
165 Peo. ex rel. v. Department of Health (1907) 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187,
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 894.
166 Peo. ex rel. v. Board of Education (1914) 212 N. Y. 463, 106 N. E. 307.
267 State ex rel. v. State Board of Dental Examiners (1894) 93 Tenn. 619,
27 S. W. 1019; State Board of Dental Examiners v. Friedman (1924) 150
Tenn. 152, 263 S. W. 75.
1618 Peo. ex rel. v. Williams (1906) 185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785.
169 (1903) 134 N. C. 77, 46 S. E. 508.
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were to compel the board to issue the license it would be the court
rather than the board which decided the question of compe-
tence. 70
In State ex rel. v. State Medical Examining Board,171 the court
refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a
license to practice medicine, saying: "The action of the board is
not merely ministerial, but partakes of a judicial character. It
is to inquire concerning and to determine as to the existence of
certain facts, and whether it should grant a certificate of quali-
fication to an applicant must depend upon that determination.
The board has not refused or neglected to act upon the matter
submitted to it. It has decided upon the application, and the
correctness of that decision, involving the exercise of the judg-
ment of the members of the board, cannot be brought into review
by this proceeding." 172
Here are two lines of authority, diametrically opposed to each
other in both theory and result. One absolutely refuses to grant
a writ of mandamus for the purpose of compelling the issuance
of a license when its issuance is discretionary, while the other
grants the writ when the license is arbitrarily refused. It would
seem that both lines of authority fail to make a necessary dis-
tinction. Discretion is a matter of degree.173 In the adminis-
tration of the law there can be neither a complete absence of
discretion nor an absolute unrestricted discretion (under the
American system of government today). If an administrator
has no discretion at all he is no more than an automaton. That
is not so. The law is not self-enforcing, and so long as it is ad-
ministered by human beings the element of judgment, no matter
how slight, will be present. Though discretion in administering
170 The remedies suggested by the court are interesting: (a) the legisla-
ture could change the provisions of the statute, (b) the plaintiff could take
the examination again, as applicants for admission to the Bar do when they
are refused admittance, or (c) if the members of the board acted arbitrarily
the plaintiff could sue them for damages.
See also: State ex rel. v. Gregory (1884) 83 Mo. 123, 53 Am. Rep. 565;
Hart v. Folsom (1900) 70 N. H. 213, 47 Atl. 603.
111 (1884) 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238.
172 See Howland v. Eldridge (1871) 43 N. Y. 392; Matter of Dorsey (1838)
7 Port (Ala.) 392; Peo. v. Judge (1843) 1 Mich. 359; Hoole v. Kinkead
(1881) 16 Nev. 217.
173 Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts (1922) 20 Mich.
L. R. 848.
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the law may approach the vanishing point it does not reach it.
From this extreme, the increase in discretion is a matter of de-
gree. At some intermediate point the judges, commentators and
students of the law draw a line and say that on one side the ad-
ministrative powers are non-discretionary or ministerial, and on
the other they are discretionary. But such a line is indefinite,
variable, and the terminology means nothing.
It is upon the supposed distinction between discretionary and
non-discretionary powers that one line of authority makes the
issuance of the writ of mandamus depend. It would seem that
such a basis is not sound. It is clear that mandamus will lie to
compel the performance of a so-called non-discretionary act. The
theory is that the court will compel an officer to perform an offi-
cial duty; if that duty requires the performance of one particular
act and no other, then the court will compel that particular action.
When discretionary action is involved, the theory is that the court
will only compel the officer to exercise his discretion, and will not
tell him how to exercise it. However, under the circumstances
of a particular case it might well be that an officer, though pos-
sessing a discretionary power, could not possibly be deemed to act
reasonably if he acts otherwise than in one particular way. If
the court finds that to be the case, why should it not compel the
officer to act in that way? It is conceded that if the officer
abuses his discretion and thereby exceeds his authority mandamus
will lie to compel him to exercise his discretion again, and in a
reasonable manner. 17 4 If there could possibly be but one rea-
sonable manner why should the court not compel the particular
action? The process of ordering the officer to exercise his dis-
cretion again might go on indefinitely. On the other hand, those
courts which freely use the writ of mandamus to compel the is-
suance of a license often ignore the possibility that though the
administrative officer may have acted arbitrarily in refusing for
a particular reason (such as the reason that he did not like the
color of the applicant's eyes), there may be other valid grounds
for refusing. The court should insist that the applicant prove
his case by negativing any such possibility.
Whether or not the use of the writ of mandamus for the pur-
pose of controlling an arbitrary exercise of discretion can be
174 State ex rel. v. Public School Board, supra, n. 159.
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justified theoretically, it seems fair to say that many courts were
forced to use it for that purpose because of the absence of any
other available remedy. If they were wrong the subject calls for
legislative treatment.
The writ of mandamus is not an available remedy in the federal
courts for the purpose of compelling an administrative official
to perform an official duty, either discretionary or non-discretion-
ary. This was decided quite early in the history of the national
courts, and probably accounts for the wide scope of the injunc-
tion in those courts. In McIntire v. Wood, 7 5 the court refused
to compel, by writ of mandamus, the Register of the Land Office
to issue to the plaintiff a final certificate of purchase, saying:
"Although the judicial power of the United States extends to
cases arising under the law of the United States, the legislature
have not thought proper to delegate the exercise of that power
[power to issue writ of mandamus] to its circuit courts, except in
certain specified cases." And in Bath County v. Amy, 176 the court
in refusing to issue the writ said: "It must be regarded as settled
that the circuit courts of the United States are not authorized to
issue writs of mandamus, unless they are necessary to the exercise
of their respective jurisdictions. These courts are creatures of
statute," and that is all the power the statutes have given them.
INJUNCTION
The injunction is an important instrument for preventing an
abuse of discretion, and it is widely used for that purpose. When
the administrative action is affirmative in character, and amounts
to an abuse of discretion there is practically no problem concern-
ing the use of the injunction, for historically its primary func-
tion is to restrain positive action which invades or threatens to
invade the rights of individuals. Both the national and the
state courts use the injunction for this purpose. An Oklahoma
statute regulating the production of petroleum authorizes a com-
mission to make "proration orders" in order to limit production.
The United States Supreme Court, when considering the validity
of a "proration order," makes it very clear that if any order were
proved to be "unjust and arbitrary, and to operate to plaintiff's
175 (1813) 7 Cranch 504.
ITS (1871) 13 Wall. 244.
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prejudice" an injunction would issue to restrain the enforcement
of the order.177 Perhaps the best known example of the use of
the injunction in this type of case is the use of an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of an unreasonable or confiscatory rate
fixed by an administrative body. In Allen v. Omaha Live Stock
Commission Company,178 the court enjoined the enforcement of
a schedule of rates established by the Secretary of Agriculture
acting under authority of the "Lever Act,' 1 9 saying: "There
can be no doubt at this day that an order of a board, commission,
or executive officer prescribing maximum rates for services per-
formed, if no provision for a review by the courts is made, en-
titles one who claims the rates to be confiscatory to a review by a
court of equity."
The doctrine is clearly stated by the court in McCullough v.
Scott.180 A North Carolina statute authorized the State Board of
Accountancy to hold examinations at such places as they deemed
proper. The Board prepared to hold an examination beyond the
borders of the state and an injunction suit was brought to restrain
the proposed action. The court issued the injunction, saying:
"The authorities . . . establish the principle that when such
officers exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their discretion, it is
subject to review by the courts; in fact, so fundamental is this
principle that in most cases the courts do not discuss it, but ad-
dress themselves to determining whether or not the act com-
plained of was in excess of jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion,
and if they decide these questions in the affirmative, then it is held
as a matter of course that the act should be enjoined or enforced,
as the case may be." There are numerous cases in which injunc-
tions were issued to restrain affirmative action amounting to an
abuse of discretion.18'
1'7Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission (1932) 286
U. S. 210.
178 (C. C. A. 8, 1921) 275 F. 1.
17940 Stat. 276.
180 (1921) 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789.
281 Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1893) 154 U. S. 362, 390 (re-
straining enforcement of unreasonable railroad rate order) ; Bulger v. Ben-
son (C. C. A. 9, 1920) 262 F. 929 (restraining the suspension of a pilot's
license for an improper cause) ; Kuenster v. Meredith (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1920)
264 F. 243 (restraining revocation of a livestock commission agent's license) ;
State ex rel. v. Mowry (1925) 119 Kan. 74, 237 Pac. 1032 (restraining a
change in boundary of a school district) ; Town of Afton v. Gill (1916) 57
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A more difficult problem is presented when the administrative
officer abuses his discretion by refusing to act, as is the case when
he arbitrarily refuses to issue a license. Is injunctive relief avail-
able in such a case? In some jurisdictions'a mandatory injunc-
tion will issue. A Texas court issued a mandatory injunction to
compel the issuance of a building permit which was arbitrarily
withheld, 182 saying: "The facts in this case conclusively show
that the acts committed by appellants [licensing body] are with-
out any justification whatever. . . . This being so, we believe
that under the authorities and practice of this state the court"
properly issued the mandatory injunction. However, the courts
often hesitate to use an injunction for such purposes,18 3 and they
do so only in those jurisdictions in which the distinctions between
law and equity are not pronounced. "Authorities recognize the
granting of preliminary mandatory injunctions to be more freely
practiced in jurisdictions in which distinctions between law and
equity do not exist than in those which adhere to the common law.
High, in discussing interlocutory mandatory injunctions, declares
that in those states where distinctions between law and equity
have been abolished a mandatory injunction is not to be dis-
tinguished from a mandamus. 1 High on Injunctions 6."184
Since the national courts will not issue a writ of mandamus for
this purpose, they purport to refuse to use an injunction as a sub-
stitute. 8 5 Yet in Wilson v. Bowers, 85 a United States District
court restrained the Collector of Internal Revenue from refusing
Okla. 36, 156 Pac. 658 (restraining issuance of bonds) ; Cruse v. Police Jury
(1922) 151 La. 1056, 92 So. 679 (restraining a change in the course of a
road).
See also the following cases in which the power to enjoin is recognized, but
in which no abuse of discretion was proved: Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of
Newark v. Welsh (1918) 71 Okla. 59, 175 Pac. 45; Message Photo-Play Co. v.
Bell (1917) 179 App. Div. 13, 166 N. Y. S. 338; Wetherly v. City of Jackson
(1933) 264 Mich. 146, 249 N. W. 484; Fritchman v. Athey (1922) 36 Idaho
560, 211 Pac. 1080; Grayson County v. Harrell (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 202
S. W. 160; Currie v. Glasscock County (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 179 S. W. 1095;
Holt v. Smith (1919) 149 Ga. 48, 99 S. E. 119; Gainesville v. Dunlap (1917)
147 Ga. 344,94 S. E. 247; Brennan v. Sewerage & Water Board (1902) 108 La.
569, 32 So. 563; Chiro v. Fourth Jefferson Drainage District (1925) 159 La.
471, 105 So. 556; Parker v. Mayor (1911) 128 La. 951, 55 So. 587.
182 Dallas v. McElroy (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 254 S. W. 599.
183 State Board of Medical Examiners v. Friedman (1924) 150 Tenn. 152,
263 S. W. 75.
18' Ibid.
18 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) 14 F. (2d) 976.
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to honor the plaintiff's application for the withdrawal of specially
denatured alcohol for which he had a basic permit.
However, a mandatory injunction is not the only equitable re-
lief possible. If a license is arbitrarily refused some courts will
issue an injunction restraining any interference with the conduct
of the business. In Chicago v. Fox Film Corporation,180 a na-
tional court considered this case: the plaintiff was arbitrarily
refused a permit to show a certain motion picture. The court
enjoined any interference with the showing of the picture, say-
ing: "In a case where the refusal of the permit amounts in law
to an abuse of discretion of the officer with whom discretion is
vested, and whereby property rights are or will be injuriously
affected" a court of equity has jurisdiction to issue a preliminary
injunction. And a Georgia court issued an injunction to restrain
interference with the installation of a certain kind of plumbing
when approval was arbitrarily refused.18 7 A California court is-
sued an injunction restraining interference with the business of
conducting a dance hall when a renewal permit was arbitrarily
refused.188 At first glance it would seem that the cases were
wrongly decided, inasmuch as a valid statute required a permit
before doing a particular act and the plaintiffs did not have a
permit. Yet upon closer examination the theory of the cases ap-
pears to be sound. Though a statute may require a permit from
an administrative officer, and though the'statute may not be sub-
ject to challenge as it leaves the legislature's hands, yet it may be
administered unreasonably-which means unlawfully-to the in-
jury of another, in which case the statute as administered be-
comes void. It is only logical that the courts should. restrain the
enforcement of the ordinance under such circumstances; "the
courts will enjoin the unreasonable and arbitrary administration
of a reasonable and valid ordinance." Such a theory is particu-
larly applicable in a jurisdiction which refuses to issue the writ
of mandamus to compel the granting of a license arbitrarily
refused.189
M86 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1917) 247 F. 231, affirmed (C. C. A. 7, 1918) 251 F. 883.
18 7 Augusta v. Loftis (1923) 156 Ga. 77, 118 S. E. 666.
lS8Supra, n. 159.
189 A contra view has been taken in Minn. in an analogous case where an
applicant, who was refused a license, operated a lumber yard without the
license. He was prosecuted and the court refused to consider his defense that
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The use of the injunction is restricted by the general rules of
equity jurisprudence and "the courts are unwilling to entertain a
bill unless rights of property are affected or threatened imme-
diately by the administrative action, resulting in injury for which
there is no adequate remedy at law."190 Where there is an ade-
quate remedy at law the injunction will not issue.191
OTHER REMEDIES
The remedy of certiorari is probably one of the most common
forms of judicial control today, 92 yet it presents no great pro-
cedural difficulties because for the most part its use is controlled
by statute. The only problem, for the purpose of this article,
deals with the-availability of the common law writ to review ad-
ministrative action. Whether or not it is available depends upon
whether the administrative action be called "judicial," for it is
settled that the common law writ of certiorari lies only to review
a judicial determination.' 93 However, there is an equally funda-
mental obstacle to the use of certiorari for the purpose of con-
trolling an apparently unguided administrative discretion. The
remedy of certiorari is available only when there is a record to
review, and in most cases of unguided discretionary power there
the refusal of the license was arbitrary. However, the basis of the decision
was that the applicant had an adequate remedy by mandamus. State v.
Rosenstein (1921) 148 Minn. 127, 181 N. W. 107.
190 Note, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in New York (1933)
33 Columbia L. R. 105, 121.
1", Grace Missionary Church v. City of Zion (1921) 300 III. 513, 133 N. E.
268; Genesee Recreation Co. v. Edgerton (1916) 172 App. Div. 464, 158
N. Y. S. 421; Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig (1916) 217 N. Y. 100, 111
N. E. 470; Lazarevick v. Stoeckel (1933) 117 Conn. 260, 167 Atl. 823;
Araneo-White Construction Co. v. Joint Municipal Sewer Comm. (1931)
9 N. J. Misc. 243, 154 Atl. 313.
192 Freund, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at sec. 134.
193 Degge v. Hitchcock (1912) 229 U. S. 162: "The writ issues only to
review a judgment .... Not being a judgment, it was not subject to appeal,
writ of error, or certiorari .... To hold that the writ could issue either be-
fore or after an administrative [as distinguished from judicial] ruling would
make the dispatch of business in the Departments wait on the decisions of
the courts," and that would "lead to consequences of the most manifest in-
convenience."
See Note, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in New York (1933)
33 Columbia L. R. 105, 113.
Also Pee. ex rel. v. McWiliams (1906) 185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785: "It is a
well settled principle that the common law writ of certiorari issues to re-
view only decisions of inferior judicial or quasi judicial tribunals."
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is no record. Particularly is this true in regard to licensing
regulations. It seems fair to say that in the absence of statutory
provision certiorari is not an adequate method of reviewing un-
guided discretionary action.
The remedy of habeas corpus, though available, is not im-
portant because very few administrative bodies have the power
of retention. Of course, in those jurisdictions which use an in-
junction to restrain the enforcement of a valid ordinance when
administered unresaonably,19 a person who is arrested for vio-
lating the ordinance, as unreasonably administered, can invoke
the writ of habeas corpus.195 If he can enjoin interference under
an ordinance unreasonably administered he can disregard the
ordinance and either secure a writ of habeas corpus if arrested or
successfully defend an action at law if prosecuted. However, if
any other remedy is available, it would be wise to use it. It is
always safer to seek affirmative relief, than to disregard a statute
thought to be invalid, either in general or as applied to particular
facts. Moreover, there are some jurisdictions which will not
allow such a defense. "Clearly he [an applicant for a license]
may not defy the law by doing the prohibited act, and then be
heard in defense on the ground of the alleged arbitrary action
of the council in refusing him a license." 196
The remedy of suing the administrative officer for damages
resulting from his abuse of discretion is not very effective,
under most circumstances. Suppose an officer refuses to issue a
license for a reason which does not authorize him, under the
statute, to refuse. He clearly abuses his discretion by so acting,
yet the courts differ as to his liability. Some hold that if he acted
in good faith he is not liable, because "whenever, from the neces-
sity of the case, the law is obliged to trust to the sound judgment
and discretion of an officer, public policy demands that he should
be protected from any consequences of an erroneous judg-
ment."' 197 Others hold that if he exceeds his jurisdictions by
194 Augusta v. Loftis, supra, n. 189.
5 Tick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 355. Defendant was arrested for
operating a laundry without a license. The court held that the ordinance
requiring a license had resulted in arbitrary discrimination against the de-
fendant, and discharged him on a writ of habeas corpus.
196 State v. Rosenstein, supra, n. 191.
1 97Downer v. Lent (1856) 6 Calif. 94: Plaintiff sued the Board of Pilot
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abusing his authority, he is liable regardless of his good faith. 98
This line of cases extends the theory that a non-discretionary
officer who exceeds his authority is liable for resulting damages.
The extension is logical, but there is an important question of
public policy involved. But conceding that the officer would be
liable, there are two very practical difficulties which limit the
effectiveness of this remedy. One is the problem of proving
damages. If one were refused a license to practice a profession
it would be most difficult to estimate damages. The other is the
problem of collecting damages. If they are very large it is prob-
able that a judgment against the ordinary public officer could not
be liquidated.
In considering whether or not the conference of apparently un-
guided administrative discretion conforms to sound legislative
practice, two other angles of the problem should be mentioned.
First, what is the effect of such practice upon the courts? By
making reasonableness the administrative standard, the burden
upon the courts is obviously increased if the question of reason-
ableness is litigated, for the legislature has "passed the buck."
Instead of saying that a license shall be issued if the applicant
conforms to specified requirements it has said that the license
shall be issued if compatible with the policy of the statute. That
means that the administrative officer must exercise a reasonable
discretion, sound judgment in deciding, and if the applicant is
dissatisfied with the decision and enlists the aid of the courts, the
courts must consider the case on its merits in order to determine
whether the administrator's action was reasonable. Of course
this effect is contingent upon litigation by the applicant, and
there are two reasons why there may not be much litigation: (a)
administration may be so efficient that there seldom will be occa-
Commissioners for revoking his license. There was no allegation of bad
faith. Held, no liability.
Valentine v. Englewood (1908) 76 N. J. L. 509, 71 At. 344: The members
of a board of health, acting in the performance of a public duty under a
statute to prevent the spread of an infectuous disease, are not personally
liable in a civil action for damages arising out of their acts in establishing
a quarantine, even where the disease does not actually exist, provided they
act in good faith.
198 McCord v. High (1868) 24 Ia. 336; Lowe v. Conroy (Wis. 1904) 97
N. W. 942; Miller v. Horton (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A.
116; Grider v. Tally (1884) 77 Ala. 422.
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sion to invoke the aid of the courts, and (b) the individual may
find it too difficult to litigate the question.
Second, what is the effect upon the operation of the statute of
making reasonableness the administrative standard? The an-
swer to this question must depend largely upon the reason why a
more definite standard was not fixed. If the reason is to be
found in the difficulty of fixing a more definite standard, the
statute may be given great flexibility in operation. As was said
by the court in Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service
Commission:199 "instead of attempting the impossible the legis-
lature gives flexibility and efficiency to the law by providing that
the commission shall first exercise its reasonable judgment . . .
and then [by] making its judgment subject to the judicial test of
reasonableness." An example is found in the power of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to fix reasonable railroad rates.
The statute is very flexible. Indeed, it is often deplored on the
ground that reasonableness depends upon so many factors that
practically any rate which the Commission sees fit to establish
can be supported by some evidence of reasonableness.
But if a more definite standard was not fixed because of care-
lessness or because the statute or ordinance regulated compara-
tively minor affairs (which includes the bulk of the cases dis-
cussed above), there is great likelihood that administration will
become standardized and the discretion shade into non-discre-
tionary ministerial action, the consent of the administrator be-
coming mandatory in the absence of a reasonable objection.200
That is what happened in State ex rel. City of Charleston.201
The ordinance before the court reserved to the city, council
power arbitrarily to refuse a restaurant license, even though the
applicant had complied with all requirements. The plaintiff
brought an action of mandamus to compel the issuance of a
license to him and the court said: "In all instances in which the
ordinances do not prescribe the conditions upon which licenses of
the kind involved here are to be had, so that all may know what
those conditions are and may stand upon an equal footing as to
the right to obtain such licenses, the applications therefor must
19D (1932) supra, n. 50.20D Freund, op. cit. supra, n. 1.
201 (1922) 92 W. Va. 57, 114 S. E. 378.
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be granted." The writ of mandamus issued. Thus the admin-
istrative agent with apparently unguided discretion became a
mere ministerial officer with the power to refuse a license only
for cause.
Another example is the case of White v. Holman.202 The
statute before the court gave the board of commissioners for
licensing sailors' boarding houses power to reject any application
for a license "as they deemed advisable." The plaintiff was re-
fused a license, and began mandamus proceedings to compel the
issuance of a license, alleging that the board's refusal was for a
reason for which it had no power to refuse. The court granted
an order of mandamus because the board did not show sufficient
reason for refusing. Did not such a decision tend to make the
power of the board non-discretionary, for even ministerial action
can be denied for cause?
Another case in point is that of Moy v. Chicago.203 An ordi-
nance regulating the operation of laundries enumerated several
requirements a laundry must meet. The mayor was given power
to revoke a license to operate a laundry if satisfied that the main-
tenance of that laundry would be dangerous to the health of the
city or the employees of the laundry. The court construed the
ordinance as giving the mayor power to revoke a license only if
the laundry was being operated in violation of specific provisions
of the ordinance designed to protect the health and safety of the
employees and the public. Did not the decision tend to make
the mayor's discretion purely ministerial?
If this is the effect the use of reasonableness as a guide has on
the operation of the statute, it is apparent that the purpose of
conferring any discretion at all is defeated. The administra-
tion might just as well have been made ministerial in the first
place. Thus, it is entirely possible that what was thought (and
perhaps intended) to be a very wide discretion may prove to be
no discretion at all.
202 (1904) 44 Ore. 180, 74 Pac. 933.
-8 (1923) 309 Ill. 242, 14 N. E. 845.
Washington University Open Scholarship
